发表机构
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology; NEC Corporation（信息通信技术研究所; 日本电气株式会社）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过测量原型QKD设备的电磁泄漏，发现发射器是主要泄漏源，并在时钟三次谐波处区分量子态，揭示了电磁侧信道漏洞。
AI 中文摘要
实际的量子密钥分发网络节点可能容易受到侧信道攻击，例如电磁泄漏。在本研究中，我们测量了一个实现时间仓诱骗态BB84协议（使用Y和Z基）的原型量子密钥分发设备的电磁发射。我们在消声室内距发射器和接收器0米和3米处测量了电磁频谱和波形。结果表明，发射器是电磁泄漏的主要来源，并且在1241.6 MHz时钟的三次谐波处生成的量子态之间观察到了明显差异。
英文摘要
Actual quantum key distribution network nodes may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as electromagnetic leakage. In this study, we measured electromagnetic emissions from a prototype quantum key distribution device implementing a time-bin decoy-state BB84 protocol with Y and Z bases. We measured the electromagnetic spectra and waveforms at distances of 0 m and 3 m from the transmitter and receiver inside an anechoic chamber. The results showed that the transmitter was the primary source of electromagnetic leakage, and distinct differences were observed between the quantum states generated at the third harmonic of the 1241.6 MHz clock.
Comments8 pages, 6 figures
Journal refPublished in IEEE Access 148897 - 148904 (2026)
DOI：10.1109/ACCESS.2026.3737227
