发表机构
King’s College London（伦敦国王学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文通过理论分析证明，在纯交换经济中，代理人按无差异价格出价的动态双重拍卖，其不动点对应瓦尔拉斯均衡，且重复拍卖的聚点收敛于带转移的均衡，从而解释了价格发现现象。
AI 中文摘要
双重拍卖机制推动价格趋向竞争均衡的倾向已在实验室实验中得到充分记录，但这一现象缺乏理论解释。本文研究纯交换经济中的动态双重拍卖，其中代理人根据其当前持有和偏好所隐含的无差异价格进行出价。我们证明瓦尔拉斯均衡与双重拍卖的不动点重合，并且重复的双重拍卖产生有界的配置和价格序列，其聚点即为带有转移的瓦尔拉斯均衡。
英文摘要
The tendency of the double auction mechanism to drive prices to competitive equilibrium has been well documented in laboratory experiments, but the phenomenon has lacked a theoretical explanation. This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices implied by their current holdings and preferences. We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.
