蜈蚣博弈中公平结果的预期触发亲社会行为
The prospect of a fair outcome triggers prosocial behaviour in the Centipede Game
- Machine Learning Group, Université Libre de Bruxelles（布鲁塞尔自由大学）
- INESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa（里斯本大学）
- Artificial Intelligence Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel（布鲁塞尔自由大学）
- Center for Human-Compatible AI, UC Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
本研究通过蜈蚣博弈实验发现，公平结果的预期能促使参与者超越自利，表现出亲社会行为，且社会偏好特质有助于实现更好的集体结果。
AI中文摘要：
人类决策不仅反映物质激励，还反映对他人收益的关注以及理解他人的能力。然而，对公平的敏感性与社会认知的各个方面相互作用并影响序贯社会互动的程度仍需进一步理解。在此，我们通过一项关于资源序贯交换的行为实验来探讨这一问题，该实验以增量蜈蚣博弈（ICG）为代表。实验设计包括一个“零终点”处理组（n=164），其中ICG有一个不产生收益的截止期限，以及一个“公平终点”处理组（n=162），其中最后一次互动导致公平结果。ICG重复进行两次，并辅以两项个体任务：社会价值取向任务（SVO）以诱发社会偏好，以及认知反思测试（CRT）以评估参与者的深思熟虑。我们的结果表明，尽管公平结果不确定，但它促使参与者超越自身利益。事实上，一个演化模型表明，当参与者足够亲社会并使用概率策略时，公平分配将游戏推向互利策略。第二次游戏重复强化了这一模式，并朝向合作适应。尽管CRT得分不能预测ICG中的行为，但偏离博弈论理性的参与者在SVO中表现出更强的亲社会性。值得注意的是，在公平终点处理组中，一些非理性参与者是个人主义者，这表明公平分配可能起到助推作用。总之，我们的发现表明，某些个人特质，如社会偏好，使个体能够克服自身利益，更好地与同伴保持一致，并在混合动机博弈中实现更好的集体结果。
英文摘要：
Human decision-making reflects not only material incentives, but also concern for others' gains and the ability to understand others. However, the extent to which sensitivity to fairness interacts with aspects of social cognition and affects sequential social interactions requires further understanding. Here, we address this question through a behavioural experiment on sequential exchanges of resources, represented by the Incremental Centipede Game (ICG). The design comprises a "zero-end" treatment (n=164), where the ICG has a deadline yielding no payoff, and a "fair-end" treatment (n=162), where the last interaction leads to a fair outcome. The ICG, which is repeated twice, is complemented by two individual tasks: the Social Value Orientation task (SVO), to elicit social preferences, and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), to assess participants' deliberation. Our results show that the fair outcome, though uncertain, prompts participants to move beyond self-interest. Indeed, an evolutionary model shows that the fair split shifts play towards a mutually beneficial strategy when players are sufficiently prosocial and use probabilistic strategies. A second game repetition reinforces this pattern, with adaptation towards cooperation. Although CRT scores do not predict behaviour in the ICG, participants who deviate from game-theoretic rationality exhibit stronger prosociality in the SVO. Notably, in the fair-end treatment, some non-rational players are individualists, suggesting that the fair split may function as a nudge. In conclusion, our findings suggest that certain personal traits, such as social preferences, allow individuals to overcome self-interest to better align with their peers and achieve better collective outcomes in mixed-motive games.
