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信息博弈:语言模型空间中的战略拥挤与企业重新定位

Information Games: Strategic Crowding and Firm Repositioning in Language-Model Space

Marcus Gawronsky, Chun-Sung Huang

arXiv 2609.37820首次发表:更新:

发表机构

Department of Finance and Tax, University of Cape Town(开普敦大学财务与税务系)

机构由 AI 辅助整理,请以论文原文为准。

AI 中文总结

本研究提出ESCAPE博弈模型,揭示竞争并不必然推动企业分离,战略拥挤可带来正收益,且相对反应成分占战略与独立企业对比的90.5%,同行结构持久但非固定。

AI 中文摘要

企业会追随不断变化的经济机会,但竞争会改变它们的应对方式。我们开发了ESCAPE,一个具有异质性能力成本的分布值定位理性份额博弈,建立了唯一均衡,并推导出一个精确的重新分配约束,将机会贡献与拥挤贡献分离开来。竞争并不必然推动企业分离:理性的企业可以进入日益拥挤的区域,因为即使拥挤成分是负的,整体重新分配收益也可能是正的。竞争反而改变了企业对相同机会变化做出不同反应的方式。在基准的多企业经济中,相对反应成分占战略企业与独立企业之间加权平方构成反应对比的90.5%;在相同能力下,该数值为零。该对比在语料库规模测量下仍然可区分。企业新闻分布记录了持久但不断变化的同行结构:优化后的同行重构在一年后保留了其总体验证优势的86.5%,即使与两个冻结重构的绝对距离都在增加。同行结构是持久的,但并非固定目的地,因此当前相似性可以保持信息性,而不会固定企业未来的相对位置。

英文摘要

Firms follow changing economic opportunities, but rivalry changes their response. We develop ESCAPE, a rational-share game of distribution-valued positioning with heterogeneous capability costs, establish a unique equilibrium, and derive an exact reallocation restriction separating opportunity and crowding contributions. Competition need not push firms apart: rational firms can enter increasingly crowded regions, because the full reallocation gain can be positive even when its crowding component is negative. Rivalry instead changes how differently firms respond to the same opportunity shift. In the benchmark many-firm economy, the relative-response component accounts for 90.5% of the weighted squared composition-response contrast between strategic and independent firms; it is numerically zero under identical capabilities. The contrast remains distinguishable under corpus-scale measurement. Corporate news distributions document persistent but changing peer structure: optimized peer reconstructions retain 86.5% of their aggregate validation advantage one year later even as absolute distance to both frozen reconstructions increases. Peer structure is persistent without being a fixed destination, so current similarity can remain informative without fixing firms' future relative positions.

论文原文

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