发表机构
Princeton University; University of Tennessee - Knoxville（普林斯顿大学; 田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文证明连续协调博弈中近视最优反应下策略群体边界按平均曲率流演化，从而将纳什均衡刻画为极小曲面，并探讨偏置版本中的相关后果。
AI 中文摘要
在连续协调博弈中，在近视最优反应下，玩家改变策略，因此策略群体随时间改变其形状。我们证明这些策略群体的边界在连续时间极限下按照自由边界平均曲率流演化。该收敛依赖于平均曲率流的近似方案，该方案先前已被用于描述其他阈值动态。借助这一等价性，我们可以将连续协调博弈的纳什均衡刻画为极小曲面，并探讨同一博弈的偏置版本中的相关后果。
英文摘要
In a continuous coordination game, under myopic best response, players change strategies, and thus strategic communities change their shapes in time. We show that the boundaries of these strategic communities evolve according to Free Boundary Mean Curvature Flow in the continuous time limit. The convergence relies on an approximation scheme for the Mean Curvature Flow, which has previously been used to describe other threshold dynamics. With this equivalence, we can characterize Nash equilibria of the continuous coordination game as minimal surfaces and explore related consequences in biased versions of the same game.
