发表机构
Georgia Institute of Technology（佐治亚理工学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究利用全球AIS数据首次大规模测量海上GPS欺骗，提出运动感知框架识别异常热点，发现31个热点中至少22个存在欺骗证据，并揭示红海与霍尔木兹海峡的长期欺骗活动，证明其作为全球性威胁的可测量性。
AI 中文摘要
GPS欺骗已成为海上安全的严重威胁，然而其全球普遍性、持续性和结构在很大程度上仍未得到测量。在本文中，我们首次利用全球自动识别系统（AIS）数据对海上GPS欺骗进行大规模测量研究，这些数据包含全球船舶随时间广播的GPS坐标。我们聚焦于大规模区域性欺骗，即外部干扰同时使一个区域内的众多船只发生位移，留下物理上不可能的、跨船只相关的运动特征；我们提出的运动感知、海洋专用的框架识别该特征，并对其发现的每个区域中的GPS欺骗证据进行分级。我们将该方法应用于2024年11月底至2025年2月初收集的超过367,000艘船只的AIS数据，识别出高流量海上区域中的31个持续异常热点，其中至少22个显示出强烈的GPS欺骗证据，其空间和时间结构与区域冲突和经济制裁相吻合。值得注意的是，我们的方法发现，导致75,000吨集装箱船MSC Antonia号高度公开搁浅事件的红海欺骗活动在该事件发生前数月就已持续进行，这一点此前未被记录。同样，我们在2026年伊朗战争使霍尔木兹海峡商业航运几乎停滞前一年多，就检测到该海峡的持续欺骗。总之，这项工作确立了GPS欺骗是对全球海上导航的一种广泛、反复且可测量的威胁。
英文摘要
GPS spoofing has emerged as a serious threat to maritime security, yet its global prevalence, persistence, and structure remain largely unmeasured. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of maritime GPS spoofing, using global Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which contain the GPS coordinates broadcasted over time by ships across the world. We focus on large-scale regional spoofing, where external interference displaces many vessels across an area at once, leaving a recognizable signature of physically implausible motion correlated across ships; our motion-aware, marine-specific framework identifies this signature and grades the evidence for GPS spoofing in each region it finds. Applying our approach to AIS data from over 367,000 vessels collected between late November 2024 and early February 2025, we identify 31 persistent anomalous hotspots across high-traffic maritime regions, at least 22 of which show strong evidence of GPS spoofing, with spatial and temporal structure aligning with regional conflict and economic sanctions. Notably, our method found that the spoofing activity in the Red Sea responsible for the highly-publicized grounding of the 75,000-ton container ship, MSC Antonia, was ongoing months before the incident, which has not been previously documented. Similarly, we detected persistent spoofing in the Strait of Hormuz over a year before the 2026 Iran war brought commercial shipping through the Strait to near-standstill. Together, this work establishes GPS spoofing as a widespread, recurring, and measurable threat to global maritime navigation.
Comments20 pages, 19 figures, To appear in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2027 (IEEE S&P)
