多人选举中的策略性投票公理
Strategic Voting Axioms for Multiwinner Elections
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本研究提出6个策略性投票公理，评估多种投票规则，发现乐观与悲观模型影响策略倾向，且所有规则均无法完全免疫策略性投票。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
我们创建了一组与策略性投票相关的6个公理，并在单一可转移投票（STV）、Meek STV、集团投票（Bloc）、Chamberlin-Courant、Monroe和k-Borda规则上对其进行了研究。对于Chamberlin-Courant、Monroe和k-Borda，我们实现了处理不完整选票的“乐观”和“悲观”模型，从而将这三个规则各自转变为两个独立的投票规则。我们确定了哪些投票规则满足每个公理。我们发现，在Chamberlin-Courant和k-Borda下，乐观模型鼓励埋没（burying）策略，而悲观模型鼓励截断（truncation）策略，这表明部分选票的处理方式对策略性投票具有重大影响。我们定义了一个名为“无跳票支付”（no skipped payment）的公理，用以区分相似规则，因为Meek STV和Chamberlin-Courant满足该公理，而STV和Monroe则不满足。每个投票规则都被发现违反了“最喜爱背叛”（favorite betrayal）公理，揭示出它们都无法完全免受策略性投票的影响。总体而言，STV变体对策略性投票相对具有抵抗力，而Monroe则易受多种策略的影响。
英文摘要
We create a set of 6 axioms relating to strategic voting and study them on single transferable vote (STV), Meek STV, Bloc, Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda. For Chamberlin-Courant, Monroe, and k-Borda, we implement ``optimistic'' and ``pessimistic'' models for handing incomplete ballots, thus turning each of the three into two separate voting rules. We determine which voting rules satisfy each axiom. We find that under Chamberlin-Courant and k-Borda, the optimistic models encourage burying, while the pessimistic models encourage truncation strategies, indicating that the handling of partial ballots has tremendous implications for strategic voting. We define an axiom called no skipped payment that differentiates similar rules, as Meek STV and Chamberlin-Courant satisfy it, while STV and Monroe fail. Each voting rule was found to fail favorite betrayal, revealing that none of them are completely immune to strategic voting. In general, STV variants are relatively resistant to strategic voting while Monroe is susceptible to a wide range of strategies.
