发表机构
Universitat Politècnica de València; University of Cambridge; King’s College London; University of Warwick; INGENIO (CSIC-Universitat Politècnica de València)（瓦伦西亚理工大学; 剑桥大学; 伦敦国王学院; 华威大学; INGENIO（西班牙国家研究委员会-瓦伦西亚理工大学））
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过访谈18名中国大陆人肉搜索幸存者，揭示人肉搜索在强制身份系统与文化逻辑下的运作机制，挑战以用户能动性为中心的隐私保护框架，提出法律、平台与社会层面的综合应对建议。
AI 中文摘要
人肉搜索，即恶意披露个人信息的行为，已成为一种普遍存在的隐私威胁。然而，现有研究仍以西方为中心，限制了我们对人肉搜索在强制身份系统、平台治理和文化逻辑从根本上重塑隐私风险与伤害轨迹的背景下如何展开的理解。我们通过对中国大陆18名人肉搜索幸存者进行半结构化访谈来弥补这一研究空白，并将他们的经历综合成一个框架，用以概念化人肉搜索在此背景下的运作方式。我们的研究发现既揭示了与先前西方研究相呼应的模式，例如与西方发现相共鸣的平台放大机制，也揭示了受监管强制（强制性身份关联）与文化逻辑（包括民族主义话语、粉丝文化、儒家价值观和低隐私素养）相互作用所塑造的中国特有动态。幸存者的经历进一步揭示了人肉搜索如何重塑对隐私的理解：从偏好变为前提条件，从瞬时披露变为时间性脆弱，从个人控制变为结构性无力。这些见解挑战了以能动性为中心的隐私框架，并表明有效的保护需要限制系统性漏洞，而非仅仅依赖用户赋能。最后，我们提出了涵盖法律改革、平台设计和社会倡议的多方面建议。
英文摘要
Doxxing, the malicious disclosure of personal information, has become a pervasive privacy threat. Yet existing research remains predominantly Western-centric, limiting our understanding of how doxxing unfolds in contexts where mandatory identity systems, platform governance, and cultural logics fundamentally reshape privacy risks and harm trajectories. We address this gap through semi-structured interviews with 18 doxxing survivors in mainland China, synthesizing their experiences into a framework conceptualizing how doxxing operates in this context. Our findings reveal both patterns echoing prior Western findings, such as platform amplification mechanisms that resonate with Western findings, and China-specific dynamics shaped by the interplay of regulatory mandates (compulsory identity linkage) and cultural logics including nationalist discourse, fandom culture, Confucian values, and low privacy literacy. Survivors' experiences further reveal how doxxing reshapes understanding of privacy: from preference to precondition, from momentary disclosure to temporal vulnerability, and from individual control to structural powerlessness. These insights challenge agency-centered privacy frameworks and suggest that effective protection requires constraining systemic vulnerabilities rather than relying solely on user empowerment. We conclude by proposing multifaceted recommendations spanning legal reform, platform design, and social initiatives.
CommentsThis paper has been accepted to appear at the 2027 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
