发表机构
Graduate School of Economics, the University of Osaka（大阪大学经济学研究科）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究无货币转移网络中正外部性下的稳健机制设计，刻画存在稳健有效机制的网络条件，并推广至更广效用函数，证明稳健福利最大化的不可能性及后验激励相容机制的存在条件。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究在信息网络中，在没有货币转移的情况下，如何在具有正外部性的代理人之间分配一种商品。每个代理人观察自己的估值以及其邻居的估值。委托人寻求通过一种对代理人异质信念层级具有稳健性的机制，将商品分配给估值最高的代理人，利用网络结构和分配外部性所产生的部分激励一致性。我们刻画了存在稳健有效机制的网络条件：当且仅当至少有两个代理人与所有其他代理人相连时，该机制存在。若将稳健性放宽为排除弱支配策略，则一个普遍相连的代理人就足够了。我们将结果推广到更广泛的效用函数类别，证明除非网络是完备的，否则稳健福利最大化是不可能的，并建立了当且仅当没有代理人被孤立时，存在一个在真实报告下有效的后验激励相容机制。
英文摘要
We study how to allocate a good with positive externalities among agents in an information network, without monetary transfers. Each agent observes their own valuation and those of their neighbors. A principal seeks to allocate the good to the highest-valuation agent through a mechanism robust to agents' heterogeneous belief hierarchies, leveraging the network structure and the partial incentive alignment created by allocative externalities. We characterize the networks for which a robustly efficient mechanism exists: it exists if and only if at least two agents are connected to all others. Relaxing robustness to rule out weakly dominated strategies, one universally connected agent suffices. We generalize the results to a broader class of utility functions, show that robust welfare maximization is impossible unless the network is complete, and establish that an ex post incentive compatible mechanism that is efficient under truthful reports exists if and only if no agent is isolated.
