发表机构
Lund University（隆德大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出针对HQC的OT-PCA侧信道攻击方法，通过离线模板和类遗传算法优化密钥信息提取，大幅减少PC预言机调用次数，且对预言机误差鲁棒性强，经仿真和ARM Cortex-M4平台功耗实验验证有效。
AI 中文摘要
本文提出OT-PCA，这是一种开展基于明文检查（PC）预言机的侧信道攻击的新方法，专门针对汉明准循环（Hamming Quasi-Cyclic, HQC）密码设计。通过调用公开可访问的HQC解码器，我们构建了离线模板，仅需一次PC预言机调用，就能高效提取数百个密钥位置的软信息。我们的方法通过类遗传算法解决了密钥相关信息提取优化中的关键挑战，包括最大化解密输出熵、确保错误模式独立性。\n大量仿真实验表明，我们的新攻击方法大幅减少了所需的预言机调用次数：与当前最先进的方法相比，针对hqc-128的调用次数降低了2.4倍，针对hqc-192和hqc-256的降低幅度更大。值得注意的是，该攻击对PC预言机的不准确性具有很强的鲁棒性——当预言机准确率降至95%时，hqc-128的预言机调用需求降低倍数提升至7.6。\n最后，我们在搭载ARM Cortex-M4微控制器的平台上通过功耗分析开展了真实环境评估，验证了该方法的实际适用性与有效性。
英文摘要
In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline templates that enable efficient extraction of soft information for hundreds of secret positions with just a single PC oracle call. Our method addresses critical challenges in optimizing key-related information extraction, including maximizing decryption output entropy and ensuring error pattern independence, through the use of genetic-style algorithms. Extensive simulations demonstrate that our new attack method significantly reduces the required number of oracle calls, achieving a 2.4-fold decrease for hqc-128 and even greater reductions for hqc-192 and hqc-256 compared to current state-of-the-art methods. Notably, the attack shows strong resilience against inaccuracy in the PC oracle-when the oracle accuracy decreases to 95%, the reduction factor in oracle call requirements increases to 7.6 for hqc-128. Lastly, a real-world evaluation conducted using power analysis on a platform with an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller validates the practical applicability and effectiveness of our approach.
Journal refIACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (TCHES), 2025(1), 251-274, 2025
DOI：10.46586/tches.v2025.i1.251-274
