多重并发提议者的地理激励研究

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究具有多重并发提议者（MCP）的系统是否激励提议者的地理去中心化。在我们的模型中，并发提议者策略性地选择其位置，以最大化其捕获的用户市场份额，用户通过比较每个提议者的包含时间来决定将交易发送至何处。用户与提议者之间的包含时间由两项组成：它们之间的距离，以及提议者与其最近验证者法定人数之间的距离，后者我们称之为法定人数半径。我们正式证明，提议者的法定人数半径是其激励的决定因素：提议者最优地选择位置以最小化其法定人数半径。我们得到的结果是，当提议者同时充当验证者时，他们会共置；而当这些角色分离时，则会出现地理多样性。我们还考察了预确认和更快的验证者间连接，表明它们削弱了法定人数半径的影响，并进一步破坏了共置激励的稳定性。

英文摘要

We study whether systems with multiple concurrent proposers (MCP) incentivize the geographic decentralization of proposers. In our model, concurrent proposers strategically choose their locations to maximize their captured market share of users, who decide where to send transactions by comparing each proposer's time to inclusion. The time to inclusion between a user and a proposer consists of two terms: the distance between them, and the distance between the proposer and her nearest quorum of attesters, the latter of which we term the quorum radius. We formally prove that proposers' quorum radii are the determinant of their incentives: proposers optimally choose where to locate in order to minimize their quorum radii. We obtain as a result co-location when proposers also serve as attesters, but geographic diversity when these roles are separate. We also examine pre-confirmations and faster intervalidator connections, showing that they attenuate the influence of the quorum radius and further destabilize co-location incentives.

发表机构

• Category Labs
• Princeton University（普林斯顿大学）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。