AI 中文总结
本文提出构建意识全栈功能主义理论的框架，通过文献综述识别意识的功能特征，强调选择性功能作用，并主张结合功能与解释性特征，通过溯因构建弥合理论差距。
AI 中文摘要
如果意识具有功能性，一个基本问题是，对某一内容的意识实际上如何改变系统对其操作的方式。我们针对特定内容X和心理或身体过程Y，询问对X的意识是否会改变X在过程Y中是否可用或可用程度。关键在于，必须在排除关于X的信息较差作为充分解释的情况下，比较X有意识和X无意识的条件。我们目前的文献综述得出了一个虽小但信息丰富的功能特征。当前最清晰的证据涉及目标敏感控制，尤其是对注意影响的调节，另有证据将意识与元认知评估联系起来。同时，一个特征绑定范式表明，短暂的特征-位置绑定和检索在无意识情况下仍可能发生。这一初步特征表明，意识具有选择性而非普遍性的即时功能作用。但这样的功能特征还不是意识理论。全栈功能主义理论还必须解释与意识相关的更广泛现象——解释性特征：知觉和情感体验的结构和呈现方式、主体-世界组织、意识判断和问题报告。最后，功能特征和解释性特征从不同方向约束理论构建，但两者都不能决定可能连接它们的过程架构。弥合这一差距需要溯因构建：提出候选架构，对其进行实现和干预，并随着更多约束的积累逐步修订。总之，我们提出了一个构建意识全栈功能主义理论的框架，并迈出了详述功能特征的第一步。
英文摘要
If consciousness is functional, a basic question is what awareness of a content actually changes in how a system operates on it. We ask, for a particular content X and mental or bodily process Y, whether awareness of X changes whether, or how well, X can be used in process Y. Crucially, X-aware and X-unaware conditions must be compared in ways that rule out poorer information about X as a sufficient explanation. Our current literature sweep yields a small but informative functional profile. The clearest current evidence concerns goal-sensitive control, especially regulation of attentional influence, with additional evidence linking awareness to metacognitive evaluation. Meanwhile, one feature-binding paradigm suggests that short-lived feature-location binding and retrieval can remain possible without awareness. This preliminary profile suggests a selective rather than universal immediate functional role for awareness. But such a functional profile is not yet a theory of consciousness. A full-stack functionalist theory must also account for the broader phenomena associated with consciousness - the explanatory profile: the structure and manner of presentation of perceptual and affective experience, subject-world organisation, awareness judgments, and problem reports. Finally, the functional and explanatory profiles constrain theory construction from different directions, but neither determines the process architecture that could connect them. Bridging this gap requires abductive construction: proposing candidate architectures, implementing and intervening on them, and progressively revising them as further constraints accumulate. In sum, we propose a framework for constructing full-stack functionalist theories of consciousness, and take the first step towards detailing the functional profile.
Comments21 pages, 3 figures
