发表机构
University of Texas at Dallas（德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究针对发射机特洛伊信道，提出恶意编码器逐符号扰动码字的模型，推导了恶意与合法消息的可达速率、解码及检测错误指数，并量化了速率、可靠性与可检测性间的权衡。
AI 中文摘要
实验表明，通信硬件的修改能够实现从发射机未经授权地窃取数据。我们研究了由此产生的发射机特洛伊信道，在该信道中，嵌入合法发射机内部的恶意编码器逐符号地扰动所传输的码字。该模型反映了此类硬件修改可用的有限占用面积、延迟和计算复杂度。我们推导了在特洛伊所引入的失配条件下，恶意消息的可达速率以及合法消息的可达速率。我们还分析了合法接收机和恶意接收机的解码错误指数，包括通过信道可解析性转移论证获得的运行指数下界。最后，我们研究了合法接收机在不同统计知识水平下的特洛伊检测，包括当已知系综平均诱导信道时的似然比检测，以及当仅已知标称信道时的拟合优度检测。由此产生的检测错误指数，连同可达速率和解码错误指数，量化了恶意消息速率、合法消息速率、解码可靠性和特洛伊可检测性之间的权衡。我们将分析专门应用于二进制对称信道和加性高斯白噪声信道，并通过数值方法展示了由此产生的权衡。
英文摘要
Experiments have shown that modifications in communication hardware can enable unauthorized exfiltration of data from transmitters. We study the resulting Transmitter Trojan channel, in which a malicious encoder embedded within a legitimate transmitter perturbs the transmitted codeword on a symbol-by-symbol basis. The model reflects the limited footprint, delay, and computational complexity available to such hardware modifications. We derive achievable rogue message rate and achievable rates for the legitimate message under the mismatch induced by the Trojan. We also analyze decoding error exponents for the legitimate and rogue receivers, including operational exponent lower bounds obtained through channel-resolvability transfer arguments. Finally, we study Trojan detection at the legitimate receiver under different levels of statistical knowledge, including likelihood-ratio detection when the ensemble-averaged induced channel is known and goodness-of-fit detection when only the nominal channel is known. The resulting detection error exponents, together with the achievable rate and decoding error exponents, quantify tradeoffs among rogue message rate, legitimate message rate, decoding reliability, and Trojan detectability. We specialize the analysis to the binary symmetric channel and the additive white Gaussian noise channel, and illustrate the resulting tradeoffs numerically.
CommentsSubmitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
