发表机构
University of Waterloo; University of Iowa（滑铁卢大学; 爱荷华大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究保险市场中逆向选择下的可实施性，提出通过循环单调性和子模性条件刻画保留函数集合，并给出保费表刻画及数值示例。
AI 中文摘要
我们考虑一个具有隐藏信息的保险市场，其中代理人的类型是私人信息，并且从任意类型空间中抽取。我们讨论了保留函数集合的可实施性概念，即如何选择保费表，使得由此产生的合同菜单是激励相容的，或者说真实报告。具体而言，对于一般类型空间，可实施性等价于保留函数集合的循环单调性。对于紧区间类型空间，我们证明在适当的类型排序假设下，子模性是可实施性的充分条件。此外，对于任何可实施的保留函数集合，我们刻画了相应的保费表。最后，我们将结果应用于几类标准的保险合同，对于这些合同，一般的可实施性条件具有更简单的刻画，并提供了若干数值示例。
英文摘要
We consider an insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type is private information and is drawn from an arbitrary type space. We study implementability of a collection of retention functions, namely, how to select premium schedules so that the resulting menu of contracts is incentive compatible, or truthful. Specifically, for general type spaces, implementability is equivalent to cyclical monotonicity of the collection of retention functions. For compact interval type spaces, we show that submodularity is a sufficient condition for implementability, under suitable type ordering assumptions. Moreover, for any implementable collection of retention functions, we characterize all corresponding premium schedules, up to a common additive constant. Finally, we apply our results to several standard classes of insurance contracts, for which the general implementability conditions admit simpler characterizations, and we provide several numerical illustrations.
