隐藏资格与采用的公信力
Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption
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- Toulouse School of Economics（图卢兹经济学院）
- International College of Economics and Finance, HSE University（高等经济大学国际经济金融学院）
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究政府随机分配回扣资格并选择披露规则，发现披露个人资格可在特定条件下将最优采用率从零提升至正，并增加福利，且该结论在考虑不完全遵从和私人信息后依然成立。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
对早期采用者的公共支持可能影响后期用户从观察到的选择中学到的内容。采用者可能拥有有利的私人信息，或者可能已获得回扣。我们研究一个政府，它随机分配固定回扣的资格，并选择该计划的覆盖范围和报告规则。我们刻画了在一般凸计划成本下，披露个人资格何时将最优覆盖率从零变为正比率。这既需要对已披露计划有利的边际回报，也需要对大规模不透明干预可获得的直接利益设定界限。在基准情形中，披露使政府能够增加早期采用和福利，同时保持预期总采用量不变。然后我们允许不完全遵从和后期用户的私人信息。资格标签可以严格提供信息而不改变任何人的决策，在这种情况下披露没有福利价值。当两种扩展都存在时，政策逆转仍然存在。结果确定了资格记录何时是采用计划设计中有用的组成部分。
英文摘要
Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices. An adopter may have favourable private information, or may have received a rebate. We study a government that randomly assigns eligibility for a fixed rebate and chooses the program's coverage and reporting rule. We characterize when disclosing individual eligibility changes optimal coverage from zero to a positive rate under general convex program costs. This requires both a favourable marginal return to a disclosed program and a bound on the direct benefit available from a large opaque intervention. In the benchmark, disclosure allows the government to increase early adoption and welfare while leaving expected total adoption unchanged. We then allow imperfect compliance and private information for the late user. An eligibility label can be strictly informative without changing anyone's decision, in which case disclosure has no welfare value. The policy reversal survives when both extensions are present. The results identify when an eligibility record is a useful part of the design of an adoption program.
