法律作者的死亡：生成式人工智能来临之际的权威、意图与法律创制
The Death of the Legal Author. Authority, Intention, And Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文探讨生成式AI（如ChatGPT）能否在无意图情况下创制法律，论证法律创制无需意图，非意图性创作可被解释为法律规范。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
以基于大型语言模型（LLM）的聊天机器人为形式的生成式人工智能已席卷法律界。法哲学正努力追赶技术发展所带来的理论意义，以及技术发展可能改变对法律现象（如法律创制和权威）的传统理解的方式。在此意义上，激烈的哲学争论大多围绕一个规范性问题展开：“人工智能应当创制和解释法律吗？”而另一个不同但更为前置的问题却较少受到关注：“人工智能能够创制和解释法律吗？”也就是说，人工智能是否能够产生可被视为“法律”（至少是我们所知的法律）的输出？人工智能能否成为“法律作者”？本文探讨了这一被忽视的问题，并试图提供一些初步答案。在第一部分，我们定义了法律权威、法律作者身份和法律解释，并主张确定性的权威作者的意图通常被视为创制和解释当代法律文本之可能性的条件。在第二部分，我们论证LLM人工智能（尤其是ChatGPT）在没有任何意图的情况下生成法律文本。在第三部分，我们考察了那些在关于规范性文本法律性质的讨论中淡化甚至消除意图的作者们的立场。最后，我们论证有充分理由支持第二类作者。无意图的智能体（如ChatGPT）创造法律文本的能力，支持了这样一种论点：法律可以在创作背后没有意图的情况下被创制，且非意图性的创作可以被解释以得出法律规范。
英文摘要
Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a normative question: "Should AI create and interpret law?". Much less attention has been given to a different, albeit previous, question: "Can AI create and interpret law?" That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as "law" (at least, law as we know it)? Can AI be a "legal author"? This paper explores this unattended question and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character of prescriptive texts. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to arrive at legal norms.
发表机构
- Faculty of Law University of Belgrade（贝尔格莱德大学法学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
