发表机构
Univ. of Aveiro; IEETA / LASI, Univ. of Aveiro; Instituto de Telecomunicações（阿威罗大学; 阿威罗大学 IEETA / LASI; 电信研究所）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
针对链上随机数生成缺乏可验证性的问题，本文提出基于提交-揭示方案的新平台，通过解决最后揭示者攻击，并在Polygon 2.0上实现低成本原型，提供可验证的链上随机性。
AI 中文摘要
随着彩票及其他高风险的去中心化应用越来越依赖不可预测的随机性来运行，缺乏一个安全、透明且所有参与者都能验证的链上随机数生成器，仍然是一个关键性的开放问题。多年来，基于区块链的随机数生成方法不断涌现，各有其优势和局限，并随着区块链技术的发展不断被超越。本文综述了现有的链上随机性方法，并提出了一种新平台，该平台建立在众所周知的提交-揭示方案之上，同时直接解决了其主要漏洞——最后揭示者攻击，即最后一个参与者可以扣留其揭示，以便在看到不利结果时偏向或中止输出。我们进一步将该方案与先前的方法进行比较，并评估其熵特性。所提出的架构将基于Web的前端与部署在Polygon 2.0区块链上的Solidity智能合约相结合。该原型已在Amoy测试网上实现和测试，成本低且部署简单，为可验证的链上随机性提供了一个实用、易用的概念验证。
英文摘要
As lotteries and other high-stakes decentralized applications increasingly depend on unpredictable randomness for their operations, the lack of a secure and transparent on-chain random number generator that is verifiable by all participants remains a critical open problem. Various approaches to blockchain-based random number generation have emerged over the years, each with their own strengths and limitations, and have consistently been superseded as blockchain technology evolved. This paper surveys existing approaches to on-chain randomness and proposes a new platform that builds upon the well-known commit-and-reveal scheme while directly addressing its principal vulnerability, the last revealer attack, in which the final participant can withhold their reveal in order to bias or abort the output upon seeing an unfavorable result. We further compare this solution with prior approaches and evaluate its entropy properties. The proposed architecture combines a web-based front-end with a Solidity smart contract deployed on the Polygon 2.0 blockchain. Implemented and tested on the Amoy testnet, the prototype is low-cost and simple to deploy, providing a practical, accessible proof-of-concept for verifiable on-chain randomness.
CommentsSubmitted to BLOCKCHAIN'26 (8th International Congress on Blockchain and Applications, Naples, Italy, October 2026)
