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arXiv 2609.30874quant-ph

从接收功率到认证密钥:一种连接经典自由空间光链路预算与诱骗态量子密钥分发的一般方法

From Received Power to Certified Secret Keys: A General Method for Bridging Classical FSO Link Budgets and Decoy-State QKD

Hasan Abbas Al-Mohammed

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中文总结 AI 辅助

本文提出一种通用接口,将经典自由空间光链路预算与诱骗态量子密钥分发相连接,实现从接收功率到可认证密钥的转换,并通过数值模拟给出不同大气条件下的性能预测。

中文摘要 AI 辅助

接收光功率决定了光子到达通量,但光子到达通量并不能认证量子密钥。本文给出了一种与部署无关的接口,将经典自由空间光(FSO)链路预算与相位随机化弱相干脉冲BB84协议、诱骗态估计以及可组合的有限密钥后处理相连接。该信道接口将几何收集、大气消光、残余指向和探测器效率分开处理,并指出了常见的几何和指向表达式在何种情况下是近似值。有限密钥输出遵循Lim等人的诱骗态分析,密钥基和测试基的计数分别估计,并以无限诱骗态渐近参考为基准。数值研究涵盖了五级衰减扫描、基概率和真空概率敏感性、条件Chernoff比较以及整数计数蒙特卡洛模拟。对于$3.33 \ imes 10^8$个发射脉冲,基于Hoeffding的预测每千比特每秒距离限制在从非常晴朗到浓雾参数化下分别为2.727、1.883、1.472、1.236和0.962公里。这些是条件性性能预测,而非实验性安全认证。卫星、无人机、高空平台、地面和列车链路通过同一接口进入,但需要各自独立的传播、捕获和设备输入。该框架将既有的安全工具整合到工程流程中,而不声称提出新的安全证明或普适距离范围。

英文摘要

Received optical power determines photon arrival flux, but photon arrival flux does not certify a quantum key. This paper gives a deployment-independent interface from a classical free-space optical (FSO) link budget to phase-randomized weak coherent pulse BB84, decoy-state estimation, and composable finite-key postprocessing. The channel interface separates geometric collection, atmospheric extinction, residual pointing, and detector efficiency, and states when common geometric and pointing expressions are approximations. The finite-key output follows the decoy-state analysis of Lim et al., with key- and test-basis counts estimated separately and an infinite-decoy asymptotic reference. The numerical study covers a five-level attenuation sweep, basis- and vacuum-probability sensitivities, a conditional Chernoff comparison, and integer-count Monte Carlo. For $3.33 \times 10^8$ emitted pulses, the Hoeffding-based predicted one-kilobit-per-second distance limits are 2.727, 1.883, 1.472, 1.236, and 0.962 km from very clear to dense-fog parameterizations. These are conditional performance predictions, not experimental security certificates. Satellite, drone, high-altitude-platform, terrestrial, and train links enter through the same interface but require their own propagation, acquisition, and device inputs. The framework integrates established security tools into an engineering procedure without claiming a new security proof or a universal range.

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