霍特林-唐斯模型中的高成本投票

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究了霍特林-唐斯模型的一个部分参与变体。每位选民都有投票成本，并且只有当其偏好的候选人带来的比较收益超过成本时才会投票。在该模型下，中位选民定理失效，我们研究了不同选民分布和成本分布下均衡中的极化程度。我们发现，极化的主要预测指标是成本分布的逆风险率，这表明在我们的模型下，极化的驱动因素是选民对候选人立场变化做出响应的意愿。随后，我们通过添加控制疏离感和候选人竞争力的参数来扩展模型，表明即使考虑其他现实因素，我们的结果也是稳健的。

英文摘要

We study a partial-participation variation of the Hotelling-Downs model. Voters each have a cost to vote, and only vote when the comparative gain from their preferred candidate exceeds the cost. Under this model the median voter theorem breaks, and we study the extent of polarization under equilibria in different voters and cost distributions. We find that the main predictor of polarization is the reverse-hazard-rate of the cost distribution, indicating that the driver of polarization under our model is the willingness of voters to respond to changes in positions of candidates. We then extend the model by adding parameters governing alienation and candidate competitiveness, showing that our results are robust even when taking into account other realistic factors.

发表机构

• Technion—Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。