发表机构
MIT; Columbia University（麻省理工学院; 哥伦比亚大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究两家企业能力竞赛与安全阈值赛跑的连续时间博弈，刻画了风险高低下竞赛与齐步均衡的存续条件，并指出能力隐藏会阻碍合作，凸显透明性价值。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了一个连续时间博弈，在该博弈中，两家企业选择以多快的速度推进自身能力，而一个外生的安全阈值以固定速率推进。当能力前沿（企业能力的最大值）超过安全阈值时，所有企业都面临共同灾难，该灾难以随能力-安全差距递增的危险率到达。我们根据灾难风险、安全推进的速度以及流动收益来刻画马尔可夫完美均衡：当这些值较低时，只有竞赛是均衡；当它们处于中等水平时，竞赛和齐步并存；当它们较高时，只有齐步存续。在所有子博弈完美均衡中，低风险导致持续竞赛，而高风险排除了竞赛，并且我们限定了所有子博弈完美均衡中灾难的概率。如果内部能力在部署前存在固定时滞的隐藏，则维持齐步更加困难，这凸显了内部能力透明性的重要性。
英文摘要
We study a continuous-time game in which two firms choose how quickly to advance their capabilities while an exogenous safety threshold advances at a fixed rate. When the capability frontier (max of firms' capabilities) exceeds the safety threshold, all firms are exposed to common disaster that arrives at a hazard rate increasing in the capability-safety difference. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria in terms of the disaster risk, how quickly safety advances, and flow payoffs: when they are low, only racing is an equilibrium; when they are intermediate, racing and pacing coexist; when they are high, only pacing survives. Across all subgame perfect equilibria, low risk induces perpetual racing while high risk rules it out and we bound the probability of disaster across all SPE. If internal capabilities are hidden with a fixed lag until deployment, it is harder to sustain pacing which highlights the importance of transparency about internal capabilities.
