发表机构
University of Rome Tor Vergata; Chalmers University of Technology（罗马第二大学; 查尔姆斯理工大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文针对5G NR上行定位中UE侧位置隐私问题，提出并评估了导频失真、人工噪声、多径和延迟欺骗等机制，揭示了隐私、通信可靠性与可检测性之间的权衡。
AI 中文摘要
未来的5G-Advanced和6G网络越来越多地重用上行通信波形进行定位和感知。这引发了隐私问题，因为用户设备（UE）即使在未明确请求定位服务时，也可能无意中泄露精确的时间信息。虽然先前的研究表明，通用的正交频分复用（OFDM）导频可以被操纵以降低到达时间（ToA）估计的精度而不影响数据链路，但本文将这些概念扩展到了实际的5G新无线电（NR）上行链路框架，包括探测参考信号（SRS）、解调参考信号（DMRS）、物理上行共享信道（PUSCH）以及标准化的3GPP信道模型。我们研究了多种UE侧隐私机制：优化导频失真、人工噪声、人工多径和延迟欺骗。通过符合3GPP标准的样本级仿真，我们通过定位、通信和基于一致性的检测指标评估了它们的影响。所得分析突出了隐私、通信可靠性和可检测性之间的权衡，为未来集成感知与通信（ISAC）系统中的波形级混淆提供了关键见解。
英文摘要
Future 5G-Advanced and 6G networks increasingly reuse uplink communication waveforms for positioning and sensing. This raises privacy concerns, as user equipments (UEs) may unintentionally reveal precise timing information even when positioning services are not explicitly requested. While prior works show generic orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) pilots can be manipulated to degrade time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation without compromising data links, this paper extends these concepts to a realistic 5G new radio (NR) up-link framework including Sounding Reference Signal (SRS), Demodulation Reference Signal (DMRS), Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH), and standardized 3GPP channel models. We investigate several UE-side privacy mechanisms: optimized pilot distortion, artificial noise, artificial multipath, and delay spoofing. Through 3GPP-compliant sample-level simulations, we assess their impact via localization, communication, and consistency-based detection metrics. The resulting analysis highlights the trade-offs among privacy, communication reliability, and detectability, providing key insights into waveform-level obfuscation for future integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) systems.
Comments6 pages, 4 figures, 1 table. Accepted for publication at the 2026 IEEE 1st Annual Integrated Sensing and Communication Conference (ISAC)
