发表机构
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, National University of Singapore（新加坡国立大学电气与计算机工程系）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文提出基于可认证密钥关系的通用框架，为陷门无爪函数构造提供密钥认证，并利用零知识论证将量子性证明编译为零知识版本，同时揭示单射不变性协议中证书的区分能力。
AI 中文摘要
陷门无爪函数（TCFs）支撑了大部分经典-量子密码交互，然而每个基于TCF的协议都将其安全性保证建立在诚实生成的密钥之上。我们给出了一种与具体函数族无关的密钥认证抽象，适用于（含噪声的）TCF构造，该抽象基于两个概念：可认证密钥关系，即一个NP关系，捕获函数族的诚实密钥，且其见证可从陷门中恢复；以及认证密钥生成，即为每个密钥输出一个成员资格证书，满足完备性、具有可提取性的证书可靠性以及密钥隐私性。我们为不同的构造实例化了可认证密钥关系，每种关系均通过针对该关系的零知识知识论证来通用地满足。作为我们的主要应用，一个通用编译器将任何基于TCF的量子性证明转换为零知识证明，每个安全属性都源自认证方案中的对应属性。最后，我们界定了该原语的能力范围：对于依赖于单射不变性的协议，一个可接受的证书本身就是一个函数族区分器，恰好泄露了此类协议必须隐藏的比特。
英文摘要
Trapdoor claw-free functions (TCFs) underpin much of classical-quantum cryptographic interaction, yet every TCF-based protocol states its guarantees relative to an honestly generated key. We give a family-agnostic abstraction of key certification for (noisy) TCF constructions, built on two notions: a certifiable key relation, an NP relation capturing a family's honest keys with witnesses recoverable from the trapdoor; and certified key generation, which emits with each key a certificate of membership satisfying completeness, certificate soundness with extractability, and key privacy. We instantiate certifiable key relations for different constructions, each met generically by a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the relation. As our main application, a generic compiler turns any TCF-based proof of quantumness into a zero-knowledge one, with each security property following from its counterpart in the certification scheme. Finally, we delimit the primitive's reach: for protocols resting on injective invariance, an accepting certificate is itself a family distinguisher, leaking exactly the bit such protocols must hide.
