谁进入记录？付费墙、贡献者选择与社会学习

中文摘要 AI 辅助

本文研究当购买先前决策的访问权也决定了谁的决策进入记录时的社会学习。个体首先接收私人信息，然后决定是否付费获取访问权。正价格筛选出相对较弱的私人信念。在只有一个创始观察的情况下，每个购买者都会复制它，记录不再获取进一步信息。在更丰富的初始历史下，购买者可能意见分歧，记录可能得到改善；然而，即使私人信念无界，远离零的价格也会阻止完全学习。随后我们考虑一种规则，在该规则下，购买者在访问前做出初步选择，在访问后做出修订选择。实施初步选择的正概率使其遵循私人信号。保留两种选择在固定有效费用或混合短视定价下恢复完全学习，包括有界信念的情况。该规则降低了支付意愿，并牺牲了部分当前决策准确性。一个实例展示了随后的信息改善如何能超过这两种初始损失。结果表明，为什么保留暴露前做出的判断可以改变后来用户从同一选定群体中学到的内容。

英文摘要

This paper studies social learning when buying access to previous decisions also determines whose decision enters the record. Individuals first receive private information and then decide whether to pay for access. A positive price selects relatively weak private beliefs. With one founding observation, every buyer copies it, and the record acquires no further information. With a richer initial history, buyers can disagree and the record can improve; nevertheless, a price bounded away from zero prevents complete learning, even with unbounded private beliefs. We then consider a rule under which a buyer makes a preliminary choice before access and a revised choice afterward. A positive probability of implementing the preliminary choice makes it follow the private signal. Retaining both choices restores complete learning under a fixed effective fee or pooled myopic pricing, including with bounded beliefs. The rule reduces willingness to pay and sacrifices some current decision accuracy. A worked example shows how the subsequent improvement in information can outweigh both initial losses. The results show why preserving a judgment made before exposure can change what later users learn from the same selected population.

发表机构

• International College of Economics and Finance, National Research University Higher School of Economics（国际经济与金融学院，国立高等经济大学）
• Toulouse School of Economics（图卢兹经济学院）

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