审计审计师：承诺与职业判断

中文摘要 AI 辅助

本文提供了一个理论框架，用以评估审计行业中自律同行评审制度与独立政府检查（PCAOB）之间的权衡。我们将同行评审制度建模为“判断机制”，在该机制下，利益相关者利用专业知识（以私人信号形式体现）对审计失败的核实做出事后决策。相比之下，PCAOB检查被建模为“承诺机制”，在该机制下，利益相关者缺乏私人信息，但可以事前承诺一个预定的核实水平。我们发现，判断机制受益于资源配置效应和由知情核实驱动的威慑效应，而承诺机制则通过事前承诺的先动优势来遏制审计失败。我们的分析表明，当且仅当私人信号足够信息丰富时，利益相关者偏好同行评审制度。此外，比较静态分析显示，更高的核实成本或更强的审计激励会使利益相关者的偏好转向PCAOB检查。

英文摘要

This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the trade-off between the self-regulated peer review system and independent government inspection (PCAOB) in the auditing profession. We model the peer review system as a Judgment Regime, where a stakeholder utilizes professional expertise, captured as a private signal, to make ex-post decisions on verifying audit failures. In contrast, PCAOB inspection is modeled as a Commitment Regime, where the stakeholder lacks private information but can commit ex-ante to a predetermined level of verification. We find that the Judgment Regime benefits from a resource-allocation effect and a deterrence effect driven by informed verification, whereas the Commitment Regime deters audit failures through the first-mover advantage of ex-ante commitment. Our analysis demonstrates that the stakeholder prefers the peer review system if and only if the private signal is sufficiently informative. Furthermore, comparative statics reveal that higher verification costs or stronger audit incentives shift the stakeholder's preference toward PCAOB inspection.

发表机构

• University of Hong Kong（香港大学）
• City University of Hong Kong（香港城市大学）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。