发表机构
Institute of Science Tokyo（东京科学大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文在公开宣告的背景下引入最终与强最终（含超限）版本的成功、自我反驳等概念，并给出它们与其他条件及不动点观点之间的关系。
AI 中文摘要
在动态认知逻辑中，成功、自我反驳、真实谎言和不可能谎言这四个概念已在公开宣告的背景下得到讨论。在本文中，我们引入了这些概念的最终版本和强最终版本，以及它们的超限版本，这些版本允许宣告的超限迭代。我们还引入了在真或假时总是具有信息性的概念。例如，一个公式是最终自我反驳的，如果每当它初始为真时，在迭代宣告下的某个有限阶段最终变为假，而强最终自我反驳进一步要求该公式在所有足够晚的阶段保持为假。有两个主要结果。第一个结果给出了强最终概念、最终概念以及其他若干条件之间的关系，这些条件包括对被宣告公式真值极限的条件、一致有界条件以及摩尔句和自我实现句的不动点观点。第二个结果给出了最终和强最终概念的有限版本与超限版本以及不动点观点之间的关系。
英文摘要
In dynamic epistemic logic, the four notions of success, self-refutation, true lies, and impossible lies have been discussed in the context of public announcements. In this paper, we introduce eventual and strong eventual versions of these notions, as well as their transfinite versions, which allow transfinite iteration of announcements. We also introduce the notions of always informativeness when true or false. For example, a formula is eventually self-refuting if, whenever initially true, it eventually becomes false at some finite stage under iterated announcements, and strong eventual self-refutation further requires the formula to remain false at all sufficiently late stages. There are two main results. The first result gives the relationship among strong eventual notions, eventual notions, and several other conditions including conditions on the limit of the truth values of the announced formula, the uniform bound condition, and the fixed-point views of the Moore sentence and the self-fulfilling sentence. The second result gives the relationship among finite and transfinite versions of the eventual and strong eventual notions and the fixed-point views.
Comments34 pages, 4 figures
