评估针对内核内存的CPU硬件木马运行时电磁检测
Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory
- Georgia Institute of Technology（佐治亚理工学院）
- Wayne State University（韦恩州立大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
本研究利用电磁辐射对RISC-V Linux系统上的硬件木马进行运行时检测，通过开源木马篡改内核内存，发现异常软件行为可间接揭示木马存在。
AI中文摘要：
侧信道是硬件木马检测的一种有前景的方法，因为它们可以在不需要额外电路或对被测设备进行破坏性分析的情况下，被动地揭示恶意硬件活动。本研究探讨了利用电磁（EM）辐射对硬件木马攻击进行运行时检测。通过使用一个实现任意内存写入原语的开源硬件木马，我们篡改了运行在RISC-V微架构上的Linux系统的内核内存，并利用处理器的电磁辐射进行了实时基线检测。我们的结果表明，在某些条件下，硬件木马可以通过其引发的异常软件行为被间接检测到。
英文摘要：
Side-channels are a promising approach for hardware trojan detection, as they can passively reveal malicious hardware activity without requiring additional circuitry or destructive analysis of the device under test. This work investigates the use of electromagnetic (EM) emanations for runtime detection of hardware trojan attacks. Using an open-source hardware trojan that implements an arbitrary memory-write primitive, we tamper with the kernel memory of a Linux system running on a RISC-V microarchitecture and perform a real-time baseline detection using the processor's EM emissions. Our results indicate that, under certain conditions, hardware trojans can be detected indirectly through the anomalous software behavior they enable.
