福利不透明收入：AI代理委托下的税收

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究当AI代理通过政府隐藏的规则实施经济相关选择时的所得税问题。除未被观察到的生产能力外，这种隐藏的偏好到执行的映射创造了“双重不可观测性”：相同的可观察税基反应可能承载不同的福利后果。我们将由此产生的收入称为“福利不透明”。我们的构造表明，即使机械福利权重相同，税基统计量可能一致，而改革福利效应却不同。我们推导出一个最优税收条件，该条件在熟悉的充分统计量上增加了一个响应加权的执行楔子。在局部过度执行下，较高的边际税率获得矫正性收益，而在局部执行不足下则产生额外成本。观察该楔子可以识别现行税率表下边际改革的福利效应；对其的界限可给出该效应的界限。一项受控实验室比较了五个AI引擎的4500次模型运行。忠实委托在几乎所有运行中选择得分最大化者。冲突目标产生异质反应：Claude基本保留得分最大化者，GLM主要向下移动，GPT-mini和Qwen显示集中下尾增加。Qwen还进行大幅向下调整。不同引擎在设计的分布的不同点和不同方向定位其偏离。显式分数使模型排名一致；基于公式的目标指令产生更不均匀的一致性。Qwen显示明确的税收与目标交互的正效应，但其方向不跨引擎推广，合并符号取决于其包含。分析确定执行信息作为传统税基统计的补充。

英文摘要

We study income taxation when an AI agent implements economically relevant choices through a rule hidden from the government. Alongside unobserved productive ability, this hidden preference-to-execution mapping creates \emph{double unobservability}: the same observable tax-base response can carry different welfare consequences. We call the resulting income \emph{welfare-opaque}. Our constructions show that tax-base statistics can coincide while reform welfare effects differ, even when mechanical welfare weights are identical. We derive an optimal-tax condition that adds a response-weighted execution wedge to the familiar sufficient statistics. A higher marginal rate gains a corrective benefit under local over-execution and an additional cost under local under-execution. Observing the wedge identifies the welfare effect of a marginal reform at the prevailing schedule; bounds on it deliver bounds on that effect. A controlled laboratory compares 4,500 model runs across five AI engines. Faithful delegation selects the score maximizer in essentially all runs. Conflicted objectives produce heterogeneous responses: Claude largely preserves the score maximizer, GLM moves predominantly downward, and GPT-mini and Qwen show concentrated lower-tail increases. Qwen also makes substantial downward adjustments. Different engines locate their departures at different points and in different directions of the designed distribution. Explicit scores align model rankings; formula-based objective instructions yield more uneven agreement. Qwen shows a clear positive tax-by-objective interaction, but its direction does not generalize across engines and the pooled sign depends on its inclusion. The analysis identifies execution information as a complement to conventional tax-base statistics.

发表机构

• The Chinese University of Hong Kong（香港中文大学）
• University of Edinburgh（爱丁堡大学）
• The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen（香港中文大学（深圳））

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。