AI 中文总结
本文提出可交易进口证书机制，在保留贸易收益的同时实现国内生产与可靠外国供应的安全目标，并通过经济胁迫模型为这些目标提供微观基础，指出数量型安全目标比关税补贴更适合作贸易协定焦点。
AI 中文摘要
最近的危机使供应安全成为贸易政策的核心议题。我们展示了可交易进口证书（TIC）如何在保留贸易收益的同时，实现国内生产和可靠外国供应的目标。在异质性目标下，每个国家的单一证书市场分散化了福利最大化配置，证书价格随条件变化内生调整。TIC能稳健地保护这些目标免受一系列偏离贸易协定的行为影响。一个经济胁迫模型为这些目标提供了微观基础，将其与短缺显著性、供应可靠性、双边贸易依赖以及反对屈服于胁迫的规范联系起来。关税-补贴协定需要更多信息，且更容易受到隐性偏离的影响。虽然共同的碳价格为气候协定提供了自然的焦点，但基于数量的安全目标可能比关税和补贴税率更适合作为贸易协定的自然焦点。
英文摘要
Recent crises have made supply security central to trade policy. We show how tradeable import certificates (TIC) implement targets for domestic production and reliable foreign supply while preserving gains from trade. A single certificate market per country decentralizes the welfare-maximizing allocation under heterogeneous targets, with certificate prices adjusting endogenously as conditions change. TIC robustly protect these targets against a range of deviations from trade agreements. A model of economic coercion microfounds the targets, linking them to shortage salience, supply reliability, bilateral trade dependence, and norms against yielding to coercion. Tariff-subsidy agreements require more information and are more vulnerable to hidden deviations. While a common carbon price provides a natural focal point for climate agreements, quantity-based security targets could be a more natural focal point for trade agreements than tariff and subsidy rates.
