发表机构
Stony Brook University; City University of Hong Kong（石溪大学; 香港城市大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文针对基于DAG的BFT共识协议，提出一个围绕对手、协议、目标和部署四族的MEV攻击空间，并通过实验证明所有评估的协议均易受攻击，且攻击成败主要由协议设计决定。
AI 中文摘要
拜占庭容错（BFT）协议即使在节点发生恶意故障的情况下也能保证安全性和活性。然而，它们并不能防止对手对交易顺序的恶意操纵，即提议者分配的顺序与客户端提交交易的顺序出现偏离。利用这种自由裁量权谋取利润的行为被称为最大可提取价值（MEV），而在基于DAG的BFT协议中，由于每个副本都并发地提议区块，而不是每轮通过一个指定的提议者来路由交易，这种问题变得更加严重。基于DAG的BFT协议上MEV攻击的激增使得由此产生的局面难以驾驭：攻击被单独报告，针对不同的协议，采用不同的指标，从而难以判断两种攻击是根本不同还是仅仅在描述方式上有所差异。本文通过提出一个针对基于DAG的BFT协议上MEV的攻击空间来弥合这一差距，该攻击空间围绕四个族组织：对手、协议、目标和部署。对于每个族，我们确定了影响攻击影响的维度。攻击空间中的每个点在每个维度上固定一个值，从而代表一种独特的、潜在的MEV攻击，然后可以在特定的基于DAG的BFT协议上实例化。我们进行了一组实验，每个实验在协议允许的情况下隔离单个维度，以实证衡量其对针对六个生产级基于DAG的BFT协议的MEV攻击成功率的影响。我们的实验评估表明，我们评估的每个协议都至少容易受到该空间中MEV攻击子集的影响，并且哪些攻击成功主要取决于协议自身的设计，而非攻击者的努力。
英文摘要
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) protocols guarantee safety and liveness despite the malicious failure of nodes. However, they do not prevent adversarial manipulation of transaction order, where the order a proposer assigns diverges from the order in which clients submitted their transactions. Exploiting this discretion for profit is known as maximal extractable value (MEV), and it is intensified in DAG-based BFT protocols, where every replica proposes blocks concurrently rather than routing transactions through a single designated proposer each round. The proliferation of MEV attacks on DAG-based BFT protocols has made the resulting landscape difficult to navigate: attacks are reported individually, on different protocols, and under different metrics, making it unclear whether two attacks differ fundamentally or merely in how they are described. This paper closes that gap by presenting an attack space for MEV on DAG-based BFT protocols, organized around four families: the adversary, the protocol, the target, and the deployment. For each family, we identify the dimensions that shape an attack's impact. Each point in the attack space fixes one value per dimension, thereby representing a distinct, potential MEV attack, which can then be instantiated on a specific DAG-based BFT protocol. We perform a set of experiments, each isolating a single dimension where the protocol permits it, to empirically measure its effect on the success rate of MEV attacks against six production DAG-based BFT protocols. Our experimental evaluation reveals that every protocol we evaluate is vulnerable to at least a subset of the MEV attacks in this space, and that which attacks succeed is mostly dictated by the protocol's own design rather than by attacker effort.
Comments26 pages, 8 figures, 4 tables
