匿名问责
Anonymous Accountability
- Toulouse School of Economics（图卢兹经济学院）
- HSE University, International College of Economics and Finance（高等经济大学国际经济与金融学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
研究专家小组在署名报告中如何披露利益冲突，发现匿名组成披露在保留信息的同时提供更强激励，其职业回报与归属、保密之比为5:4:1。
AI中文摘要：
我们研究专家小组在报告署名且专家关心自身能力声誉时，应如何披露可审计的利益冲突。在密封的二元评估提交之前，审计员承诺不披露任何倾向信息、披露每位署名专家的倾向，或仅披露每个方向上倾向的专家人数；披露发生在报告锁定之后。在保持报告行为固定的情况下，组成披露与个体归属在有限小组规模的每个水平上对于学习状态而言恰好是布莱克韦尔等价的。在署名报告保持公开的条件下，组成是在状态无损的倾向披露中信息量最小的：每个无损的公开消息都必须使组成与报告一起可恢复。然而，激励却截然不同。在大小组规模接近混合的极限下，在归属、保密和组成披露下，遵循证据反对自身倾向的局部职业回报之比为1:4:5。在参数的一个开集上，两个极端制度在对称截断策略中仅有混合，而组成披露允许一个颤抖稳健的信息性均衡。在该区域的下边界附近，一系列组成均衡是稀疏的——遵循证据的比率约为1/N阶——但诱导了一个非退化的状态实验。因此，匿名披露可以在保留归属下可用信息的同时，创造更强的产生该信息的激励。
英文摘要：
We ask how an expert panel should disclose auditable conflicts of interest when reports are named and experts care about their reputations for ability. Before sealed binary assessments are filed, an auditor commits to disclosing no orientation information, each named expert's orientation, or only the number of experts oriented in each direction; disclosure occurs after reports are locked. Holding reporting behaviour fixed, composition disclosure and individual attribution are exactly Blackwell-equivalent for learning the state at every finite panel size. Conditional on named reports remaining public, composition is minimal among state-lossless disclosures of orientations: every lossless public message must make the composition recoverable together with the reports. Incentives nevertheless differ sharply. In the large-panel limit near pooling, the local career returns to following evidence against one's orientation under attribution, secrecy, and composition disclosure stand in the ratio 1:4:5. On an open set of parameters, the two extreme regimes have only pooling within symmetric cutoff strategies, while composition disclosure admits a tremble-robust informative equilibrium. Near the lower boundary of this region, a sequence of composition equilibria is sparse---the evidence-following rate is of order 1/N---yet induces a nondegenerate state experiment. Anonymous disclosure can therefore preserve the information available under attribution while creating stronger incentives to produce it.
