发表机构
Toulouse School of Economics; Université de Rouen Normandie, LERN; ENS Paris-Saclay, CEPS（图卢兹经济学院; 鲁昂诺曼底大学，LERN; 巴黎萨克雷高等师范学校，CEPS）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究政府在无法完全承诺尊重私人回报时，通过提高资本税来保护资本，证明在特定条件下收入中性增税可提高合规概率并可能促进投资，并刻画了有限承诺下的最优税收配置。
AI 中文摘要
本文研究了当政府无法完全承诺在投资后尊重私人回报时的税收构成问题。财政当局必须通过劳动收入和资本收入来为既定支出融资。普通税收收入受到保护，但机会主义的行政长官可以攫取剩余资本支付的一部分。我们证明，只要劳动税低于其局部固定工资收入峰值，并且均衡保持在正则混合分支上，那么资本税的收入中性增加会提高合规概率。这一结果不依赖于资本与劳动之间的替代弹性。同样的改革可以提高投资：预期留存收益的增加必须超过因合规信息量减少而导致的机会主义者持续收益的下降。我们还刻画了完全合规条件下的拉姆齐配置。有限承诺此时对可持续资本支付施加了一个上限，而不是对法定资本税率设定一个普遍的下限。最后，我们区分了当局对未来关注度的变化与两个参与者耐心程度的增加。前者在延续福利为凸时有利于更具信息量的政策；后者在简化形式的政策问题中没有无条件的指向。
英文摘要
This paper studies the composition of taxation when the government cannot fully commit to respecting private returns after investment. A fiscal authority must finance a given expenditure from labor and capital income. Ordinary tax receipts are protected, but an opportunistic executive can seize part of the remaining capital payment. We show that a revenue-neutral increase in the capital tax raises the probability of compliance whenever the labor tax is below its local, fixed-wage revenue peak, provided the equilibrium remains on a regular mixing branch. This result does not depend on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The same reform can raise investment: the gain in expected retention must outweigh the decline in the opportunist's continuation gain as compliance becomes less informative. We also characterize the Ramsey allocation conditional on full compliance. Limited commitment then imposes a ceiling on sustainable capital payments, rather than a general lower bound on the statutory capital-tax rate. Finally, we distinguish a change in the authority's concern for the future from an increase in both actors' patience. The former favors more informative policies when continuation welfare is convex; the latter has no unconditional direction in the reduced-form policy problem.
