发表机构
University of Edinburgh; New York University（爱丁堡大学; 纽约大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文从认知科学与计算机科学视角，将目标视为组合性表征，探讨其句法与语义的区分，以揭示不同目标表征的表达力、设计空间及对高级认知与动机研究的启示。
AI 中文摘要
在认知科学和计算机科学中，目标（goals）被概念化为认知状态，这些状态与世界知识灵活结合，以组织和规定有目的的行为。由此，目标是组合性表征（compositional representations），其内容与理性行为相关。我们在此关注目标作为表征及其内容，因为这凸显了与认知科学其他领域（尤其是语言学与逻辑学中的句法-语义接口）的相似性，同时也突出了关于不同目标表征的表达力、设计及效率的基础性问题。例如，目标通常被视为固定的并对期望行为施加约束，但我们也可以识别对目标表征本身的约束，例如特定目标语言是否具有足够的表达力以捕获感兴趣的行为，或者不同的目标表征是否捕获相同的行为。在此，我们综合了旨在刻画不同目标表征属性的研究，并表明这些属性是更广泛设计空间中的点。最后，我们讨论区分目标的形式与意义如何能够阐明我们对目标所做的隐含假设，为研究高级认知与动机之间的相互作用提供信息，并分离不同目标概念的变化轴。
英文摘要
In both cognitive science and computer science, goals are conceptualized as cognitive states that flexibly combine with world knowledge to organize and specify purposeful behavior. In this way, goals are compositional representations whose content relates to rational behavior. We here draw attention to goals as representations and their content because it highlights a parallel with other areas in cognitive science - in particular, the syntax-semantics interface in linguistics and logic - while also foregrounding foundational questions about the expressivity, design, and efficiency of different goal representations. For example, goals are typically taken as fixed and imposing constraints on desirable behaviors, but we can also identify constraints on goal representations themselves, such as whether a particular goal language is sufficiently expressive to capture behaviors of interest, or whether different goal representations capture the same behavior. Here, we synthesize work that aims to characterize the properties of different goal representations and suggest these are points of a broader design space. We close by discussing how distinguishing the form and meaning of goals can elucidate the implicit assumptions we make about goals, inform the study of interactions between higher-level cognition and motivation, and isolate axes of variation for different conceptions of goals.
CommentsTo appear in Topics in Cognitive Science, special issue on Goal-Centric Perspectives in Cognitive Science
