发表机构
Department of Economics, Seoul National University（首尔大学经济系）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文通过均衡模型证明高通按手机征收的非歧视性专利附加费并非芯片中立，会扭曲竞争并偏向高通，且从价附加费的抗辩前提不成立。
AI 中文摘要
高通的“不许可，无芯片”政策使其能够对每部手机征收专利许可附加费，无论该手机是否使用高通调制解调器芯片。在FTC诉高通案中，第九巡回法院接受了高通的论点，即由于附加费不随芯片变化，因此是“芯片中立的”，并且不会扭曲手机制造商的选择，从而推翻了地区法院的判决。我开发了一个调制解调器芯片市场的均衡模型，并证明该抗辩是错误的：附加费的表面对称性并不意味着经济中立性。对于按手机征收的附加费，附加费和等额的政府税收对竞争对手定价的影响相同，但对高通的影响不同：税收上缴国库，而高通收取附加费——包括对使用竞争对手芯片的手机。因此，在附加费制度下，提高自身价格给高通带来的收益（对转移到竞争对手的需求所收取的附加费）小于税收制度下的收益（自身销售损失所避免的税收），因为转移比率小于1。在使税收具有芯片中立性的条件下，附加费使竞争对手的全包价格严格高于高通的价格——并且在对称需求下，也使其产量下降更多——从而促使手机制造商偏向高通。对于从价附加费，该抗辩因另一个原因而失败：即使非歧视性税收也通常仅在FRAND许可费率为零时才具有芯片中立性，因此该论点的前提本身就不成立。我还分析了歧视性附加费。
英文摘要
Qualcomm's No License, No Chips policy let it levy a royalty surcharge on every handset, whether or not it used a Qualcomm modem chip. In FTC v. Qualcomm, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court after accepting Qualcomm's argument that, because the surcharge did not vary with the chip, it was "chip neutral" and left handset makers' choices undistorted. I develop an equilibrium model of the modem chip market and show the defense to be wrong: the surcharge's facial neutrality does not imply economic neutrality. For per handset surcharges, a surcharge and an equal government tax affect the rival's pricing identically, but not Qualcomm's: a tax is remitted to the Treasury, whereas Qualcomm collects the surcharge -- including on handsets using a rival's chip. Raising its own price therefore yields Qualcomm a smaller gain under the surcharge (the surcharge it collects on the demand diverted to the rival) than under the tax (the tax it avoids on its own lost sales), because the diversion ratio is less than one. Under the very conditions that would make a tax chip neutral, the surcharge raises the rival's all in price by strictly more than Qualcomm's -- and, under symmetric demand, lowers its output by more as well -- tilting handset makers toward Qualcomm. For ad valorem surcharges, the defense fails for a different reason: even a non discriminatory tax is generically chip neutral only if the FRAND royalty rate is zero, so the argument's premise itself does not hold. I also analyze discriminatory surcharges.
