为何有些罢工持续更久：部分功能机构的韧性悖论
Why Some Strikes Last Longer: The Resilience Paradox of Partially Functional Institutions
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本研究提出最小动力学模型，揭示残余活动通过直接抑制与间接降低机构回应压力两种机制，在特定阈值下导致罢工参与随残余活动增加而上升的韧性悖论，并给出精确补偿条件。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
罢工并不必然导致机构的完全中断，尤其是在非罢工部门维持部分正常活动的情况下。我们提出了一个最小动力学模型，以研究这种残余活动如何影响劳资冲突的持续性。该模型通过两种竞争机制将罢工参与、机构回应和整体功能耦合在一起：残余活动对罢工参与的直接抑制作用，以及因机构解决冲突压力降低而产生的间接效应。解析计算揭示了一个反直觉的机制区间，在该区间内，增加残余活动反而会增加（而非减少）稳态罢工参与。我们通过罢工响应敏感性来表征这一行为，并推导出一个精确的补偿阈值，将常规机制区间与韧性悖论机制区间区分开来。在该阈值处，两种机制恰好平衡，使得稳态罢工参与与残余活动无关。数值结果证实了解析预测，并阐明了潜在机制。我们的结果表明，机构韧性可能产生一种意外的动力学后果：通过吸收罢工产生的部分干扰，持续运作可能降低机构回应的紧迫性，从而有利于冲突的持续。这提供了一个简单例子，说明个体层面的稳定过程如何在复杂社会系统中集体产生反直觉的结果。
英文摘要
Labor strikes do not necessarily lead to complete institutional disruption, particularly when non-striking sectors maintain part of normal activities. We propose a minimal dynamical model to investigate how such residual activity affects the persistence of labor conflicts. The model couples strike participation, institutional response, and overall functionality through two competing mechanisms: a direct suppressive effect of residual activity on strike participation and an indirect effect arising from the reduced institutional pressure to resolve the conflict. Analytical calculations reveal a counterintuitive regime in which increasing residual activity increases, rather than decreases, stationary strike participation. We characterize this behavior through a strike-response susceptibility and derive an exact compensation threshold separating the conventional regime from a resilience-paradox regime. At the threshold, the two mechanisms exactly balance, making stationary strike participation independent of residual activity. Numerical results confirm the analytical predictions and illustrate the underlying mechanism. Our results show that institutional resilience can have an unintended dynamical consequence: by absorbing part of the disruption generated by a strike, continued operation may reduce the urgency of institutional response and thereby favor conflict persistence. This provides a simple example of how individually stabilizing processes can collectively generate counterintuitive outcomes in complex social systems.
