无对照组情况下的声誉
Reputation without a Control Group
AI总结：
研究长期顾问与短期工作者间的声誉动态，构建平稳序贯均衡，揭示顾问在声誉提升后通过中断项目以维持声誉，且微弱证据可能长期延迟其暴露。
AI中文摘要：
当顾问警告某项任务困难时，若其建议被更彻底地遵循，对该顾问的评估可能变得更加困难。我们研究了一位长期任职的顾问和相继出现的短期工作者，这些工作者在标准实施与强化实施之间进行选择。标准实施能够揭示警告是否正确，并为下一位工作者提供获取节省成本的实践知识的机会。强化实施则保护项目，但仅产生关于顾问的零星证据。我们构建了一个平稳序贯均衡，在该均衡中，顾问最初接受信息性实施，在其声誉提升后扣留下一个项目，并在继承的知识丧失后恢复推荐。选择中断是因为它改变了继任者的实施决策：保留知识会在相关历史节点逆转顾问的偏好。所有已实现的证据保持公开。微弱的后续证据最终会结束低能力顾问的保护，但这可能需要很长时间。
英文摘要：
An adviser who warns that a task is difficult may become harder to evaluate when her advice is followed more thoroughly. We study a long-lived adviser and successive short-lived workers who choose between standard and intensive implementation. Standard implementation reveals whether the warning was correct and gives the next worker an opportunity to acquire cost-saving practical knowledge. Intensive implementation protects the project but produces only occasional evidence about the adviser. We construct a stationary sequential equilibrium in which the adviser initially accepts an informative implementation, withholds the next project after her reputation improves, and resumes recommendations once inherited know-how has been lost. The interruption is chosen because it changes the successor's implementation decision: preserving know-how reverses the adviser's preference at the relevant history. All realized evidence remains public. Weak subsequent evidence eventually ends the low-ability adviser's protection, but this can take a long time.
