首个伽利略SAS认证时间解决方案
First Galileo SAS Authenticated Time Solution
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- KU Leuven（荷语鲁汶大学）
- DG DEFIS, European Commission（欧盟委员会防卫工业与太空总局）
- Septentrio, part of Hexagon（Hexagon旗下Septentrio公司）
- Univ. Autonoma de Barcelona (UAB), CERES, IEEC（巴塞罗那自治大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
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中文总结 AI 辅助
针对GNSS欺骗威胁，本文首次实现基于伽利略SAS认证信号的定时解，通过简化协议和软件接收机从认证伪距计算时钟偏差，验证了认证定时的可行性。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
针对民用GNSS接收机的欺骗攻击日益普遍，尤其是在冲突区域附近，这些攻击如今每天都会干扰民用航空、海上作业和关键基础设施。欺骗攻击之所以可能发生，是因为传统民用GNSS信号在导航数据和测距码方面在很大程度上是可预测的，使得攻击者能够伪造信号，向毫无防备的接收机强加虚假的位置和时间。伽利略开放服务导航消息认证（OSNMA）等密码认证方案通过验证导航数据的真实性来缓解这一威胁。然而，测距码本身仍然不受保护。为了弥补这一缺口，伽利略正在E6-C信号中引入信号认证服务（SAS），该服务直接认证测距测量值。目前，SAS仅由椭圆轨道平面上的两颗卫星传输，其中最多一颗在任一时刻可见，这意味着尚无法实现完整的位置解算；然而，经过地理参考的接收机仍然可以获得认证的时间解。本文据作者所知，首次提出了基于认证的民用GNSS信号计算的时间解。我们开发了一个快照软件接收机，实现了伽利略SAS协议的简化版本，利用Septentrio工程原型软件定义无线电接收机记录的射频数据，从认证的伪距计算接收机时钟偏差。我们使用在不同地点收集的两颗具备SAS能力的卫星的录音来评估所得的时间解，展示了在SAS全面运行部署之前认证定时的可行性。
英文摘要
Spoofing attacks against civilian GNSS receivers have grown more common, especially near conflict zones where they now disrupt civil aviation, maritime operations, and critical infrastructure on a daily basis. Spoofing is possible because legacy civil GNSS signals are largely predictable in both their navigation data and ranging codes, allowing an attacker to forge a signal that imposes a false position and time on an unsuspecting receiver. Cryptographic authentication schemes such as Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) mitigate this threat by verifying the authenticity of the navigation data. The ranging code itself, however, remains unprotected. To close this gap, Galileo is introducing a Signal Authentication Service (SAS) in the E6-C signal, which directly authenticates ranging measurements. SAS is currently transmitted by only two satellites in an elliptical orbital plane, of which at most one is visible at a time, meaning a full position solution is not yet possible; however, a georeferenced receiver can still obtain an authenticated time solution. This paper presents, to the authors' knowledge, for the first time, a timing solution computed from an authenticated civil GNSS signal. We develop a snapshot software receiver implementing a simplified version of the Galileo SAS protocol to compute the receiver clock bias from an authenticated pseudorange, using radio-frequency data recorded with an engineering prototype software-defined radio receiver from Septentrio. We evaluate the resulting timing solution using recordings from both SAS-capable satellites collected at different locations, demonstrating the feasibility of authenticated timing ahead of full SAS operational deployment.
