发表机构
University of Hong Kong（香港大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文利用结构模型和法院记录数据，揭示智利三大药店如何通过供应商中介验证合谋程序，从价格战转向卡特尔并攫取租金。
AI 中文摘要
本文利用法院记录的每日价格数据和一个结构模型，研究了智利三大连锁药店如何从价格战转向合谋。在法院下令禁止广告比较后，亏本定价策略的预期收益大幅下降，削弱了继续价格战的动机。这些连锁药店随后利用上游供应商作为中介，验证了一种合谋性价格领导程序。一旦验证成功，它们便应用该程序恢复前亏本商品的利润率，随后进一步提高价格以攫取租金。这些价格提升的扩散速度慢于利润率恢复。自适应置信度设定允许对跟随者参与的主观信念进行更新，其与租金攫取累积扩散的匹配度优于单位置信度设定。单位置信度设定通过将领导者的权重固定为一，施加了理性信念基准。
英文摘要
This paper studies how Chile's three largest pharmacy chains moved from the price war to collusion, using court-record daily prices and a structural model. After a court-ordered advertisement ban ended the comparison campaign, the estimated gain from loss-leader pricing fell sharply, weakening the incentive to continue the price war. The chains then used an upstream supplier as intermediary to verify a collusive price-leadership procedure. Once verified, they applied it to restore margins on former loss leaders. They then raised prices further to extract rents. These increases spread more slowly than margin restoration. The Adaptive Confidence specification allows a subjective belief about follower participation to update. It more closely matches the cumulative spread of rent extraction than the Unit Confidence specification. Unit Confidence imposes the rational-belief benchmark by fixing the leader's weight at one.
Comments45 pages, 15 figures. Online appendix included as an ancillary file
