风险下的谨慎且公平的社会评估
Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk
浏览论文内容
中文总结 AI 辅助
本文在个体效用不可比较且风险情形下，采用负确定性独立性和帕累托条件，刻画了谨慎等分布等价（CEDE）社会评估标准，以最低确定性等价评估风险分配。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
在本文中，我们研究了当个体具有期望效用偏好但其效用函数在人际间不可比较时，风险下资源分配的社会评估标准。我们特别关注关于事后分布的谨慎评估。作为关键理性公理，我们采用了Dillenberger（2010）提出的负确定性独立性。利用该公理以及既与理性公理兼容又与事后公平兼容的帕累托条件，我们刻画了一类称为谨慎等分布等价（CEDE）标准的社会标准。这些标准通过一组由个体效用函数构建的社会效用函数上的最低确定性等价来评估风险情形。
英文摘要
In this paper, we study criteria for social evaluation of resource distributions under risk when individuals have expected utility preferences but their utility functions are interpersonally non-comparable. In particular, we focus on cautious evaluation with respect to ex-post distributions. As a key rationality axiom, we adopt Negative Certainty Independence, introduced by Dillenberger (2010). Using this axiom together with Pareto conditions that are compatible with both the rationality axiom and ex-post equity, we characterize a class of social criteria called Cautious Equally Distributed Equivalent (CEDE) criteria. These criteria evaluate risky situations by the lowest certainty equivalent over a set of social utility functions constructed from individual utility functions.
发表机构
- Hitotsubashi University（一桥大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
