发表机构
Queen’s University; University of Toulouse Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Alabama; Culverhouse College of Business（女王大学; 图卢兹第一大学; 图卢兹经济学院; 阿拉巴马大学; 卡尔弗豪斯商学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究广告支持平台的最优机制设计，发现平台在广告收入与信息租金间权衡，导致内容访问和广告曝光的扭曲，并解释高广告盈利为何削弱内容质量投资激励。
AI 中文摘要
许多数字平台通过出售内容访问权和展示广告来赚取收入。我们研究了一个平台向异质消费者分配异质内容和广告时的垄断筛选问题。广告产生收入，并通过干扰影响信息租金，从而改变平台分配内容的激励。最优机制在广告与租金提取之间权衡：扩大内容访问会增加广告收入，但通过提高信息租金而减少销售收入。该机制在内容访问和广告曝光方面呈现出新颖的扭曲，为广告支持平台上的合同提供了合理化解释，并解释了为何更高的广告盈利能力可能削弱投资于内容质量的激励。
英文摘要
Many digital platforms earn revenue by selling content access and displaying ads. We study monopoly screening by a platform allocating heterogeneous content and ads to heterogeneous consumers. Advertising generates revenue and affects information rents through nuisance, which alters the platform's incentives to allocate content. The optimal mechanism balances a trade-off between advertising and rent extraction: Expanding content access increases advertising revenue but reduces sales revenue by raising information rents. The mechanism features novel distortions in content access and ad exposure, rationalizes contracts across ad-supported platforms, and explains why greater ad profitability may weaken incentives to invest in content quality.
Comments96 pages, including Supplemental Appendix. JEL codes: D42, D82, L15, O31
