发表机构
Georgia Institute of Technology（佐治亚理工学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过访谈20名美国海军和海岸警卫队海员，揭示军事海上网络安全实践中组织抽象性、非正式风险建模及安全导向响应模型，并提出融合航海条令与现代系统的改进建议。
AI 中文摘要
网络战已成为当代地缘政治冲突的关键组成部分。然而，关于军事组织和人员如何处理网络安全问题的系统性研究极为有限。军事环境与其他作战环境相比具有独特性，拥有巨大的资源可用性（2024年美国军费开支接近1万亿美元）、严格的指挥链以及其行动所带来的非同寻常的后果。因此，军事网络安全是一个独特但研究不足的课题。在本文中，我们通过调查军事人员如何理解、识别和应对网络风险，迈出了理解军事网络安全的早期一步。我们聚焦于海上军种，并仔细考虑组织障碍，设计了一项非机密研究，并对来自美国海军和海岸警卫队舰艇的20名军事海员进行了半结构化访谈。通过我们的调查，我们识别出军事系统受损的独特后果，包括武器被接管和蓄意的地缘政治升级。我们发现，网络安全在舰船上组织层面是抽象的，因此海员们从非正式经验而非正式指导中构建网络风险模型。尽管如此，他们通过识别作战影响并采用以安全为导向的事件响应模型来使网络安全具有可操作性，该模型创造了韧性，但可能延迟网络归因和遏制。这些发现为帮助军事操作人员构建网络威胁框架、将悠久的航海条令与现代系统相融合，以及将军事见解应用于民用部门提供了可操作的建议，所有这些都旨在保障更广泛的海上环境安全。
英文摘要
Cyberwarfare has become a key component of contemporary geopolitical conflict. However, there has been extremely limited systematic investigation into how cybersecurity is handled by military organizations and personnel. The military context is unique compared to other operational ones, with immense resource availability (U.S. military spending approached 1 trillion dollars in 2024), a rigid chain of command, and extraordinary consequences for its actions. Thus, military cybersecurity is a distinct yet understudied topic. In this paper, we take an early step at understanding military cybersecurity by investigating how service members understand, recognize, and respond to cyber risk. We focus on maritime services and carefully consider organizational barriers to design an unclassified study and conduct semi-structured interviews with 20 military mariners from U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels. Through our investigation, we identify unique consequences of compromising military systems, including weapon takeover and purposeful geopolitical escalation. We find that cybersecurity is organizationally abstract on ships, so mariners build cyber risk models from informal experience rather than formal instruction. They nonetheless make cybersecurity actionable by recognizing operational impacts and responding with a safety-oriented incident-response model that creates resilience but may delay cyber attribution and containment. These findings inform actionable recommendations to help military operators frame cyber threats, merge longstanding nautical doctrine with modern systems, and apply military insights to the civilian sector, all to secure the broader maritime environment.
Comments17 pages, 4 figures, To appear in the Proceedings of the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '26)
