发表机构
Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
提出PDoS混合攻击，结合信号威慑与寄生收益提取，利用矿池奖励机制补贴成本，证明高价值环境下破坏PoW区块链活性可自我维持甚至盈利。
AI 中文摘要
工作量证明（PoW）区块链的安全性和活性从根本上依赖于矿工的经济理性。现有的激励驱动型拒绝服务攻击（如BDoS）能够阻止理性矿工参与，但要求攻击者持续承受大量经济损失，因此难以在高价值网络中维持。同时，先前基于渗透的扣留攻击旨在提取收益而非直接破坏链的活性。我们提出PDoS，一种结合区块头信号威慑与寄生收益提取的混合攻击。PDoS在破坏区块链活性的同时，利用受害矿池的份额奖励机制来补贴攻击成本，从而降低了诱导理性矿工关闭所需的对抗性哈希算力阈值。我们进一步展示了一个反直觉的结果：在高手续费或高MEV环境中，更高的区块价值可能使PoW系统更不安全，因为这会增加攻击者的寄生收益，并将攻击推过盈亏平衡点，进入自我维持甚至有利可图的阶段。据我们所知，PDoS是首个证明破坏PoW区块链活性在经济上可以自我维持甚至有利可图的攻击。
英文摘要
The security and liveness of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains fundamentally depend on the economic rationality of miners. Existing incentive-driven denial-of-service attacks, such as BDoS, can deter rational miners from participating, but require the attacker to continuously absorb substantial economic losses and are therefore difficult to sustain in high-value networks. Meanwhile, prior infiltration-based withholding attacks are designed to extract revenue rather than to directly disrupt chain liveness. We present PDoS, a hybrid attack that combines block header signal deterrence with parasitic revenue extraction. PDoS disrupts blockchain liveness while exploiting the victim pool's share-reward mechanism to subsidize the attack cost, thereby lowering the adversarial hash-power threshold required to induce rational miners to shut down. We further show a counterintuitive result: in high-fee or high-MEV environments, higher block value can make PoW systems less secure by increasing the attacker's parasitic revenue and pushing the attack across the break-even point into a self-sustaining, or even profitable, regime. To the best of our knowledge, PDoS is the first attack to demonstrate that disrupting PoW blockchain liveness can be economically self-sustaining and even profitable.
Comments34 pages, 10 figures
