社会应在何处划定界限？集体同意的社会选择方法
Where Should Society Draw the Line? A Social Choice Approach to Collective Consent
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文通过公理化社会选择方法研究集体同意，提出三个原则及相应解决方案概念，并确定批准加权否决核心，实验验证理论违反原则的概念在经验上也违反。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
社会必须不断确定其认为可接受的边界，从立法决策到管理自主系统的护栏。我们开创了集体同意的公理化研究：给定个人对选项的态度，哪些选项应获得社会同意？我们的分析围绕三个原则展开：充分支持、少数保护以及由决定性更优选项主导。每个原则都捕捉了拒绝给予某选项社会同意的不同理由。针对每个原则，我们开发了相应的解决方案概念，该概念透明地实施该原则，并在数学精确意义上是规范的。例如，对于少数保护，所得概念是Moulin比例否决核心的同意适应版本。同时平衡多个原则更具挑战性。为解决这一问题，我们对否决核心进行了博弈论刻画，自然产生了一系列相关概念。从这一系列中，我们确定批准加权否决核心特别可取。通过使少数群体的阻止权力依赖于被挑战选项的批准支持，它平滑地在比例少数保护与多数支持之间插值。在五个涵盖高风险决策（如政治选举、伦理AI评估和道德决策）的数据集上的实验表明，理论上违反某原则的解决方案概念在经验上也违反该原则。
英文摘要
Society constantly has to determine the boundaries of what it deems acceptable, from legislative decisions to the guardrails governing autonomous systems. We initiate the axiomatic study of collective consent: given individuals' attitudes toward options, which options should receive societal consent? We organize our analysis around three principles: sufficient support, minority protection, and dominance by decisively better options. Each captures a distinct reason for withholding societal consent from an option. For each principle, we develop a corresponding solution concept that transparently implements the principle and is canonical in a mathematically precise sense. For example, for minority protection, the resulting concept is a consent-adapted version of Moulin's Proportional Veto Core. Balancing multiple principles simultaneously is more challenging. To address this, we develop a game-theoretic characterization of our veto core that naturally gives rise to a family of related concepts. From this family, we identify the Approval-Weighted Veto Core as particularly desirable. By making minorities' blocking power depend on the approval support of the options being challenged, it smoothly interpolates between proportional minority protection and majority support. Experiments on five datasets spanning high-stakes decision-making (such as political elections, ethical AI evaluations, and moral decision-making) show that solution concepts violating a principle in theory also violate it empirically.
发表机构
- Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam（波茨坦大学哈索·普拉特纳研究所）
- University of Oxford（牛津大学）
- University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
