HermiCache：面向可信执行环境的围栏感知缓存替换策略
HermiCache: Enclave-Aware Cache Replacement for Trusted Execution Environments
- ENSTA（法国国立高等先进技术学校）
- Université Bretagne-Sud（南布列塔尼大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
AI总结：
针对TEE缓存侧信道攻击，提出围栏感知缓存替换策略HermiCache，在RISC-V CVA6内核实现，面积开销仅6%，提供细粒度确定性保护。
AI中文摘要：
可信执行环境（TEEs）保护围栏内存免受不可信软件的攻击，但由于共享微架构资源，仍易受到基于缓存的侧信道攻击。现有对策使用缓存分区或随机化等技术：如果设计者希望实现细粒度配置和确定性保护，这些解决方案并不理想。在本文中，我们介绍了HermiCache，它正是为满足这些需求而提出的。HermiCache专为RISC-V内核设计，并已在OpenHwGroup CVA6内核中实现，软件层采用Keystone TEE。该方案在处理器核心上的面积开销为6%。
英文摘要：
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) protect enclave memory from untrusted software but remain vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks due to shared microarchitectural resources. Existing countermeasures use techniques such as cache partitioning or randomization: these solutions are not ideal if a designer wants fine-grained configurations and a deterministic protection. In this paper, we introduce HermiCache which is an answer to these requirements. HermiCache is designed for RISC-V cores and has been implemented in the OpenHwGroup CVA6 core with a Keystone TEE for the software layer. The solution has an area overhead of 6% on the processor core.
