知识生产中的监督层级

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究知识生产中的同行监督设计。一个委托人领导着从事不同但相关任务的代理人。通过处理自己的任务，代理人获得对评估同行绩效有用的信息。我们考虑稳健契约，在该契约下，所有代理人的努力是唯一可理性化的结果。最优契约诱导出一个监督权威层级：委托人更容易直接监督的代理人被赋予更大的评估其他代理人的权威。任务多样性提高了信息价值，但削弱了同行监督。这种张力使最优的公开任务分配偏向委托人的核心专长。保密随机分配通过将信息生产与感知的监督结构解耦来缓解这种扭曲。

英文摘要

We study peer monitoring design in knowledge production. A principal leads agents who work on different but related tasks. By working on their own tasks, agents acquire information that is useful for evaluating their peers' performance. We consider robust contracts under which effort by all agents is the unique rationalizable outcome. The optimal contract induces a hierarchy of monitoring authority: agents easier for the principal to monitor directly are assigned greater authority to evaluate other agents. Task diversity improves information value but weakens peer monitoring. This tension distorts optimal public task assignment toward the principal's core expertise. Confidential random assignment relaxes this distortion by decoupling information production from the perceived monitoring structure.

发表机构

• Queen’s University（女王大学）
• University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill（北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。