发表机构
Bielefeld University; University of Rome Tor Vergata（比勒费尔德大学; 罗马托尔维加塔大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过理论模型和实验室实验，探讨了模型不确定性下发送者与接收者之间的叙事战略沟通，发现利益冲突大小决定均衡沟通，偏见越强发送者越夸大信息、接收者越纠正建议，且叙事仅在低偏见时略有说服力。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了在模型不确定性下叙事的战略沟通。发送者拥有关于公开可观测数据的真实数据生成过程的私人信息。接收者不确定如何解读数据，但意识到发送者具有战略性地提供解读（即“叙事”）的动机。我们在理论上表明，发送者与接收者之间利益冲突的大小是均衡沟通的关键决定因素。特别是，发送者的偏见越强，（i）发送者越会夸大其信息，（ii）接收者越会纠正发送者的行动建议。在一项实验室实验中，我们发现了与这两个预测一致的证据，表明人们在复杂和不确定的环境中会考虑叙述者的战略动机。额外的分析显示，叙事的可能性并不驱动接收者的行为，并且叙事平均而言仅在偏见较低时具有轻微的说服力。
英文摘要
We investigate the strategic communication of narratives under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data-generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret the data, but aware of the sender's incentives to strategically provide interpretations (``narratives''). We theoretically show that the size of the conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver is a crucial determinant of equilibrium communication. In particular, the stronger the sender's bias, (i) the more senders exaggerate their information and (ii) the more receivers correct the sender's action recommendations. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence in line with both predictions, suggesting that people in complex and uncertain environments take a narrator's strategic incentives into account. Additional analyses reveal that narrative likelihood does not drive receiver behavior and that narratives are, on average, slightly persuasive only when bias is low.
