发表机构
University of York; University of Salerno（约克大学; 萨莱诺大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文证明在偶数选民的多维空间多数投票中，即使核心点非孔多塞赢家，从任何现行政策出发经有限次多数支配（真诚投票）最终可达核心。
AI 中文摘要
本文考虑了（多维）空间多数投票情境。我们分析了具有偶数（大于或等于4）个选民的情境，并假设每个选民对政策集合的偏好是“欧几里得式”的：即，每个选民都有一个最偏好的“理想”政策，且选民从政策中获得的收益随着政策与理想政策之间（欧几里得）距离的增加而减少。我们将注意力限制在核心具有单一元素且该元素属于政策集合内部的核心投票情境上。已知在该文献中通常的条件下，这一核心元素一般不是孔多塞赢家：即，至少存在一个核心之外的政策，使得核心政策无法通过仅一轮多数支配从该政策到达。然而，我们证明，在这种条件下，从任何现行政策出发，通过有限序列的多数支配（我们隐含地假设真诚投票），最终会到达核心中的政策。
英文摘要
In this paper we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We analyze such situations having an even number (greater than or equal to 4) of voters and assume that each voter's preference over the set of policies is ``Euclidean": i.e., each voter has a most preferred ``ideal" policy and the voter's pay-offs from policies decrease as the (Euclidean) distance of the policies from the ideal policy goes up. We confine attention to voting situations for which the core has a single element belonging to the interior of the policy set. It is known that under conditions usual in this literature, this element of the core, generally, is not a Condorcet winner: i.e., there is at least one policy outside the core such that the core-policy cannot be reached from it by just one round of majority domination. We demonstrate that, however, under such conditions, starting from any policy in place, by a finite sequence of majority-dominations (we assume, implicitly, sincere voting) the policy in the core is reached eventually.
