基于DAG的分布式账本系统的去中心化网络拥塞控制

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们针对基于有向无环图（DAG）的分布式账本技术（DLT）网络，提出了一种基于变量和行为的节点特定工作量证明（PoW）模型，以缓解去中心化网络拥塞控制问题。集中式通信系统的网络拥塞控制是一个成熟的研究领域，已有详细且持续的研究。然而，去中心化网络中的拥塞控制受到的关注相对较新且探索不足，尤其是在区块链和基于DAG的网络等DLT中。对于DLT网络，网络拥塞由多种因素引起，如交易垃圾信息、用户基数增加以及新代币的发行。我们重点关注区块链和基于DAG的DLT网络内交易垃圾信息所导致的拥塞。基于每秒交易数的网络吞吐量和共识过程，基于DAG的DLT比区块链网络更需要控制网络垃圾信息。DLT共识框架内的PoW模型对垃圾信息是一种有限的威慑。我们的模型为所有利益相关者提供平等机会，无论其计算资源如何。它防止并惩罚任何试图以超过规定数量的交易进行垃圾信息攻击或主导网络的节点。由于系统节点竞争以有限的网络资源发布交易，我们通过非合作博弈展示系统行为。此外，我们通过证明博弈中纳什均衡的存在性，表明我们的模型在节点间强制执行规定行为。

英文摘要

We propose a variable and behavior-based node-specific proof-of-work (PoW) model for a directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledger technology (DLT) network to mitigate decentralized network congestion control. Network congestion control for centralized communication systems is an established field of study, with detailed and continuous research being done on the subject. However, attention to congestion control in decentralized networks is relatively recent and underexplored, especially with DLT, such as blockchain and DAG-based networks. For the DLT networks, the network congestion is caused by factors such as transaction spamming, an increase in the user base, and the launch of new tokens. We focus on the congestion caused by the spamming of transactions within the blockchain and DAG-based DLT network. Based on the network throughput of transactions per second and consensus procedure, the DAG-based DLT needs to control network spamming more than the blockchain network. The PoW model within the DLT consensus framework is a limited deterrent against spamming. Our model provides equal opportunities for all stakeholders regardless of their computational resources. It prevents and penalizes any node that attempts to spam or dominate the network with more than the prescribed number of transactions. Since the system nodes compete to issue transactions with finite network resources, we display the system behavior through a non-cooperative game. Further, we show that our model enforces prescribed behavior amongst the nodes through the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in the game.

发表机构

• IIT Kanpur（坎普尔印度理工学院）

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