机密虚拟机中未修改TLS服务的会话证明

中文摘要 AI 辅助

机密虚拟机简化了将现有服务迁移到可信执行环境的过程，然而证明其网络连接通常需要更改应用程序、TLS实现或证书。我们提出了SessionLatch，它在保留这三者的同时提供会话证明。关键洞察在于，对服务器本地生成的临时公钥的可信观察，结合标准TLS密钥确认，即可在不访问TLS密钥的情况下建立TEE端点保证。这将证明集成移至操作系统：一个临时闩锁在证据交换与应用程序TLS握手重叠期间持有客户端加密记录，并在验证后自行移除。由此产生的连接保留企业服务认证和原生TLS数据路径，无需额外的负载加密。相互证明使用相同的构造，并在两个端点重叠证据生成。我们实现了Linux和Windows集成，并评估了真实的Hygon CSV证明。在交错Linux/Windows实验中，SessionLatch相对于TNG将短上传平均延迟降低了63.1%/23.0%。这些结果表明，会话证明可以加强现有机密服务，而无需在其数据路径中引入永久代理。

英文摘要

Confidential cloud services aim to protect sensitive requests from the infrastructure that executes them. However, running a service inside a trusted execution environment does not ensure that users' plaintext appears only within the protected environment. We formulate Endpoint-Substitution Relay (ESR), a common attack outcome in which an adversary receives plaintext at a client-accepted endpoint while relaying requests to the legitimate service to preserve correct behavior. We present TLSLatch, a transparent session-attestation mechanism for services running in confidential virtual machines. TLSLatch attests the protected origin of the server's ephemeral TLS 1.3 key share and gates outbound traffic until verification succeeds. It requires no changes to applications, TLS libraries, certificates, or application protocols, and adds no extra payload-encryption layer. We implement TLSLatch with a hardware-backed Hygon CSV CVM server and clients on Linux, Windows, and macOS. Across these platforms, TLSLatch reduces completion time for 1KB requests by 56.9%--65.5% compared with nested TNG, and for 64MB requests by 43.8%--82.4% compared with CMaaS using application-key reuse. These results show that transparent session attestation can preserve existing TLS stacks while adding low-overhead endpoint binding to confidential cloud services.

发表机构

• NSFOCUS Technologies Group Company Ltd（启明星辰信息技术集团股份有限公司）
• Fujian Normal University（福建师范大学）
• Hefei University of Technology（合肥工业大学）

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