发表机构
Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam; Eindhoven University of Technology（波茨坦大学哈索·普拉特纳研究所; 埃因霍温理工大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究提出带候选人质量分数的基于批准的多人投票模型，引入新公理并设计规则，在保证比例性的同时保留至少3/4最优总质量。
AI 中文摘要
我们开创了一种新的基于批准的多人投票模型的研究，在该模型中，每位候选人携带一个外生质量分数，用以捕捉例如候选人的可靠性或其与选择背景的相关性。质量分数打破了基于批准的多人投票的标准假设，即候选人完全由其支持者集合来定义。我们重新思考在存在质量分数的情况下，比例代表制意味着什么。为此，我们引入了基于阈值和基于价值的公理族，分析了它们之间的关系、可满足性和计算复杂性，并提出了能够实现我们比例公理的最强联合可满足组合的规则。然后，我们分析了比例性与最大化所选候选人总质量这一自然目标的兼容性。虽然强加标准的比例性概念可能导致质量几乎完全损失，但我们表明，在一类新的互惠公理下，该公理通过其共同批准的候选人的质量来缩放群体的应得权益，总是存在保留至少最优总质量3/4的比例委员会，并且这样的委员会可以由我们的投票规则以无额外计算成本的方式计算得出。
英文摘要
We initiate the study of a new model of approval-based multiwinner voting in which each candidate carries an exogenous quality score, capturing, for instance, the reliability of the candidate or their relevance to the context of the selection. Quality scores break with the standard assumption of approval-based multiwinner voting that candidates are fully defined by the set of their supporters. We rethink what proportional representation means in the presence of quality scores. For this, we introduce a threshold-based and a value-based family of axioms, analyze their relationships, satisfiability, and computational complexity, and present rules that achieve the strongest jointly satisfiable combinations of our proportionality axioms. We then analyze the compatibility of proportionality with the natural goal of maximizing the summed quality of the selected candidates. While imposing standard proportionality notions can lead to an almost complete loss of quality, we show that under a new class of reciprocal axioms, which scale a group's entitlement by the quality of its commonly approved candidate(s), there always exist proportional committees retaining at least 3/4 of the optimal summed quality, and such committees can be computed by our voting rules at no additional computational cost.
Comments47 pages
