ZK-Trace：面向联邦GNSS干扰监测的零知识凭证认证共谋追踪
ZK-Trace: Certified Collusion Tracing with Zero-Knowledge Credentials for Federated GNSS Interference Monitoring
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中文总结 AI 辅助
ZK-Trace提出结合零知识凭证与Tardos指纹的联邦GNSS干扰监测共谋追踪方案，实现离线可验证追踪，在实验中成功隔离所有单一所有者副本并追踪绝大多数混合副本。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
联邦全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）监测将专有分类器分发给部分可信的站点，其中任何站点都可能泄露其副本。ZK-Trace结合了公共身份标记、接收者特定的Tardos指纹和零知识凭证验证。注册表支持离线追踪，无需泄露者配合。我们针对任意恢复的比特模式建立了条件性误指控界限，在隐藏偏差残差信道下建立了有限完备性界限，并为相关特征蒸馏误差建立了确定性追踪分数界限。区间算术检查器使条件性界限可执行，并在指控和篡改决策之间分配共同预算。在无辜行独立性假设下，基于证书的评估使用每次调查0.001的误命名预算。它隔离了所有160个单一所有者副本，并在不命名无辜者的情况下追踪了720个双所有者混合中的712个。实验使用模拟GNSS联邦和CIFAR-10。特征匹配在20/20次运行中保留了特征标记，在19/20次运行中实现了跨架构迁移，在GNSS和CIFAR-10上的副本准确率成本分别为4.8和6.1个百分点。仅功能蒸馏会消除特征标记，蒸馏也会移除权重空间标记。这些结果支持在明确的统计和密码学假设下进行可验证追踪。凭证知识和接收者证据扮演着不同的角色。
英文摘要
Federated global navigation satellite system (GNSS) monitoring distributes a proprietary classifier to partly trusted stations, any of which may leak its copy. ZK-Trace combines public identity marks, recipient-specific Tardos fingerprints, and zero-knowledge credential verification. The registry supports offline tracing without the leaker's cooperation. We establish conditional false-accusation bounds for arbitrary recovered bit patterns, a finite completeness bound under a hidden-bias residual channel, and a deterministic tracing-score bound for correlated feature-distillation errors. An interval-arithmetic checker makes the conditional bound executable and allocates a common budget across accusation and tamper decisions. Under innocent-row independence, the certificate-based evaluation uses a false-naming budget of 0.001 per investigation. It isolates all 160 single-owner copies and traces 712 of 720 two-owner mixtures without naming an innocent. Experiments use a simulated GNSS federation and CIFAR-10. Feature matching preserves the feature mark in 20/20 runs and cross-architecture transfer in 19/20, at copy-accuracy costs of 4.8 and 6.1 percentage points on GNSS and CIFAR-10. Function-only distillation erases the feature mark, and distillation also removes weight-space marks. These results support verifiable tracing under explicit statistical and cryptographic assumptions. Credential knowledge and recipient evidence serve distinct roles.
发表机构
- Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits IIS（弗劳恩霍夫集成电路研究所）
- University of Technology Nürnberg (UTN)（纽伦堡工业大学（UTN））
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
